| 文件 | 最后提交记录 | 最后更新时间 |
|---|---|---|
Feat/deepx npu detector (#24336) * feat(deepx): add DEEPX NPU detector and runtime integration. * feat(deepx): enforce model_format requirement when ppu is enabled and add integrity checks for driver installation * Update frigate/detectors/plugins/deepx.py Public method lacks docstring Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Refactor DEEPX detector tests, support SSD and DAMO-YOLO * feat(deepx): add anchor-free output decoding and corresponding tests * Add tests and updates for DEEPX detector and refactor DEEPX accelerator code structure. * fix: enhance model type validation and update documentation for DEEPX detector * fix: add support for customizable score and NMS thresholds * refactor: infer YOLO layout from the model, drop per-detector options and the dxrtd placeholder * fix: keep only the anchor-free PPU verdict, re-read anchor-based each frame * Update latency data for DEEPX NPU * Expanding PPU support for DEEPX and set yolo-generic as default. * enhance scale count resolution logic * Extend PPU layout handling and YOLOX support to DEEPX detector * fix: assume the largest PPU anchor table when the .dxnn has no layout * Improve PPU decoding and introduce strides handling * Improve PPU scope and fix box format mismatch * Fix unnamed node issue that breaks traversal * fix: update object detection model type description to remove outdated architecture --------- Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> | 6 天前 | |
Dynamically install and load detector dependencies (#24156) * Dynamically install and load detector dependencies * Cleanup * Cleanup | 15 天前 | |
Manually build intel driver (#22881) * build intel driver * Update docs | 5 个月前 | |
switch nginx-vod-module to the maintained dio-az fork (#24123) The `v1.x` line is the same muxed fMP4 code as Kaltura's 1.31 with fixes backported, so the mapping JSON, manifest routes, and ffmpeg consumers are unchanged. The `MAX_CLIPS` patch applies as-is and the HEVC workaround is rewritten for the fork's reformatted source. `vod_hls_version 6` is now explicit because the fork replaced Kaltura's automatic version calculation with a directive that defaults to 4 and only warns when fmp4 needs 6, so playlists were being stamped `EXT-X-VERSION:4` while carrying `EXT-X-MAP`. The `error_page 502 =404` hack is gone: https://github.com/kaltura/nginx-vod-module/issues/468 is a `vod_mode remote` bug and we're `mapped`, so those 502s were really `_vod_response` returning 404 upstream. The fork maps that through now, and the hack was also turning real 5xx into "no recordings". | 15 天前 | |
Miscellaneous fixes (0.18 beta) (#23854) * fix watchdog process restarts reverting to the boot config /api/config/set parses a new FrigateConfig and swaps the API and dispatcher onto it, but FrigateApp.config was never rebound, so the watchdog factories rebuilt a crashed process from the config as of startup. Fix is to read through a ConfigHolder that the swap updates. * fix birdseye camera overrides being clobbered by a global mode change A global birdseye save published only the global object, leaving the output process to infer which cameras were inheriting by comparing against the previous global mode. That cannot tell an inherited value from an explicit one that happens to match, so it overwrote the override until a restart. Publish the per-camera values the config parse already resolved instead. * Reject non-finite numbers in GenAI review descriptions A model returning NaN for confidence or potential_threat_level slipped through the model_construct fallback, which skips validation, and was written into the review segment's JSON data. NaN is not valid JSON, so every subsequent /review request failed with "Out of range float values are not JSON compliant", blanking the review page for any time range containing the poisoned row. * restore fused DetectionOutput in the OpenVINO SSD model conversion * fix rgb swap issue for face dataset testing script | 1 个月前 | |
Fix jetson build (#20808) * Fix jetson build * Set numpy version in model wheels * Use constraint instead * Simplify | 10 个月前 | |
Miscellaneous fixes (0.18 beta) (#23763) | 2 个月前 | |
Community Supported Boards Framework (#7114) * Make main frigate build non rpi specific and build rpi using base image * Add boards to sidebar * Fix docker build * Fix docs build * Update pr branch for testing * remove target from rpi build * Remove manual build * Add push build for rpi * fix typos, improve wording * Add arm build for rpi * Cleanup and add default github ref name * Cleanup docker build file system * Setup to use docker bake * Add ci/cd for bake * Fix path * Fix devcontainer * Set targets * Fix build * Fix syntax * Add wheels target * Move dev container to trt * Update key and fix rpi local * Move requirements files and set intermediate targets * Add back --load * Update docs for community board development * Update installation docs to reflect different builds available * Update docs with official and community supported headers * Update codeowners docs * Update docs * Assemble main and standard builds * Change order of pushes * Remove community board after successful build * Fix rpi bake file names | 3 年前 | |
Container security hardening (phase 3, breaking) (#24081) * Run the frigate service as the frigate user * Run go2rtc as its own restricted user * Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx * Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root * Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user * Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access * Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep * Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI * only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted * tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script * chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout * set HOME to /config for non-root services * run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user * re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart * discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t * unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs * report progress during the ownership sweep * document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services * expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules * document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware * skip lost+found during the ownership sweep * hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start * make bundled models readable by the runtime user * reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root * harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild /tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run. * collapse the duplicated sentinel comment * add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services * validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names * let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop * record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot * cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper * chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create * chown the database files after init * recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning * assert granular root services in CI * document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES * own every directory level created for a recording segment * clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish * skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep * clarify granular root services docs * clean up * install acl for device access grants * grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot * assert device access grants in CI * document automatic device access grants * stop telling users device access needs host side setup * clarify the non-root docs * link the migration script to the repo * group the manual device setup under one section * harden against symlink attacks /config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink. - go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file - go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES - sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file - ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume - validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids - docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens * tweak docs * stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own * keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root | 15 天前 | |
Container security hardening (phase 1) (#24061) * Verify s6-overlay downloads against pinned checksums * Verify go2rtc download against pinned checksums The v1.9.14 release publishes no checksums file, just the bare per-platform binaries, so these digests come from a one-time fetch rather than upstream. That pins the artifact against later substitution, which is the realistic threat for a version we stay on for months, but it does not verify the original download. The stage moves from `ADD --link` to a script because `ADD --checksum` can't express an architecture-dependent URL. * Verify main image downloads against pinned checksums Covers everything the main image downloads on the default path: tempio, the hailort runtime tarball and wheel, the six ffmpeg builds, the libedgetpu deb, and the thirteen Intel driver debs. The hailort tarball was streamed straight into `tar`, which can't be verified before extraction, so it downloads to `/tmp` first. The three ffmpeg blocks per arch collapse into one `install_ffmpeg` helper since they only differed by URL and install dir, and the Intel debs go through a `fetch_intel_deb` helper for the same reason. The Intel debs are the ones that mattered most here. They're installed as root with `dpkg` on the default amd64 path and had no verification at all. compute-runtime publishes a `ww<week>.sum` asset with every release and npu-driver published `checksum.sha256` on v1.19.0, so those eight digests came from upstream rather than from us. intel-graphics-compiler and level-zero publish none, so those five and everything else here come from a one-time fetch, which pins the artifact against later substitution but doesn't verify the original download. The comment above the map says which is which and how to refresh them, since npu-driver has stopped publishing sums since v1.19.0 and that provenance won't survive the next bump. Still unpinned: `get-pip.py`, which is a rolling URL where a digest would just break the build on pypa's next edit, and the per-variant artifacts for Axera, Synaptics, and Jetson. apt repositories are out of scope since apt already verifies signatures. * Restrict generated TLS key permissions OpenSSL 3.x already writes the key at 600 on its own, so this pins the guarantee rather than fixing an observed leak: the mode no longer depends on the openssl version or the umask the service happens to start with. Only the generated pair is touched. User-mounted certs take the other branch and are never chmod'd, which matters when they're mounted read-only. * Add security headers and server_tokens off Adds `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, and turns off nginx version disclosure. No `X-Frame-Options` and no CSP `frame-ancestors`. HA's Webpage card and iframe panels frame Frigate's own address cross-origin, and either header would break them silently with nothing in Frigate's logs to explain it. Ingress is same-origin and would survive `SAMEORIGIN`, but Frigate can't tell the two apart from inside the container. `security_headers.conf` is a plain file in the image rather than a generated one, so anyone who does want framing restrictions can bind-mount it. `add_header` doesn't inherit into a block that declares its own, so the include goes in per block, all nine of them, including the four nested static-asset locations that serve the JS bundles. Those are the ones nosniff actually matters for. The run script now reads `get_nginx_settings.py` once into a variable instead of shelling out per template. That script imports the frigate config machinery, which is noticeable on an SBC. Not fixed here: `listen.conf` is included at server level and carries `Strict-Transport-Security`, so those same nine blocks already drop HSTS under TLS today. Folding it into this file would change existing TLS behavior on nine paths, so it needs its own PR. * Restrict go2rtc config file permissions * Log failed login attempts with source address Failed logins returned a bare 401 and left nothing behind, so credential stuffing was invisible unless you were already watching nginx access logs. Both failure branches now log a warning with the attempted username and the client address. The address comes from `get_remote_addr()`, the same helper the login rate limiter keys on, so the two agree on who the client is and the trusted-proxy handling is consistent. Logging a raw `x-forwarded-for` instead would let an attacker forge the source address in the very log line meant to catch them. The response is unchanged and identical either way. Which factor failed is only visible in the log, never to the client, and the password is never logged. * Recommend least-privilege container options in install docs The compose generator pushed `privileged: true` into every file it produced, no matter what hardware you picked, and it's the default tab on the install page so it's what most people copy. It now emits `security_opt: no-new-privileges:true` instead, and only adds `privileged: true` for hardware that actually needs it, with the reason inline. MemryX is the only one today, since it needs to reach the max-manager. Rockchip and Synaptics only want privileged during initial setup and their documented end state is device mappings, so neither gets it. `no-new-privileges` merges into the same `security_opt` block as any device-specific entries, so Rockchip still gets its `apparmor=unconfined` and `systempaths=unconfined` without a duplicate key. The static example now has `privileged` commented out, and there's a short section on the options worth adding, with a note that `cap_drop: ALL` breaks `telemetry.stats.network_bandwidth` since nethogs needs NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW. * Add amd64 container smoke test to CI Boots the built amd64 image against a minimal config and asserts the two security headers, that the Server header no longer carries a version, that no frame-ancestors is present, that nginx accepts its own config, and the two file modes. This is also the harness the rest of the hardening work extends. The two negative assertions are written as `if grep; then exit 1; fi` rather than `! grep`. Bash exempts a negated command from `set -e`, so the `!` form would have passed even with the version and frame-ancestors both present, which is the opposite of what a regression net is for. | 15 天前 | |
Container security hardening (phase 1) (#24061) * Verify s6-overlay downloads against pinned checksums * Verify go2rtc download against pinned checksums The v1.9.14 release publishes no checksums file, just the bare per-platform binaries, so these digests come from a one-time fetch rather than upstream. That pins the artifact against later substitution, which is the realistic threat for a version we stay on for months, but it does not verify the original download. The stage moves from `ADD --link` to a script because `ADD --checksum` can't express an architecture-dependent URL. * Verify main image downloads against pinned checksums Covers everything the main image downloads on the default path: tempio, the hailort runtime tarball and wheel, the six ffmpeg builds, the libedgetpu deb, and the thirteen Intel driver debs. The hailort tarball was streamed straight into `tar`, which can't be verified before extraction, so it downloads to `/tmp` first. The three ffmpeg blocks per arch collapse into one `install_ffmpeg` helper since they only differed by URL and install dir, and the Intel debs go through a `fetch_intel_deb` helper for the same reason. The Intel debs are the ones that mattered most here. They're installed as root with `dpkg` on the default amd64 path and had no verification at all. compute-runtime publishes a `ww<week>.sum` asset with every release and npu-driver published `checksum.sha256` on v1.19.0, so those eight digests came from upstream rather than from us. intel-graphics-compiler and level-zero publish none, so those five and everything else here come from a one-time fetch, which pins the artifact against later substitution but doesn't verify the original download. The comment above the map says which is which and how to refresh them, since npu-driver has stopped publishing sums since v1.19.0 and that provenance won't survive the next bump. Still unpinned: `get-pip.py`, which is a rolling URL where a digest would just break the build on pypa's next edit, and the per-variant artifacts for Axera, Synaptics, and Jetson. apt repositories are out of scope since apt already verifies signatures. * Restrict generated TLS key permissions OpenSSL 3.x already writes the key at 600 on its own, so this pins the guarantee rather than fixing an observed leak: the mode no longer depends on the openssl version or the umask the service happens to start with. Only the generated pair is touched. User-mounted certs take the other branch and are never chmod'd, which matters when they're mounted read-only. * Add security headers and server_tokens off Adds `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, and turns off nginx version disclosure. No `X-Frame-Options` and no CSP `frame-ancestors`. HA's Webpage card and iframe panels frame Frigate's own address cross-origin, and either header would break them silently with nothing in Frigate's logs to explain it. Ingress is same-origin and would survive `SAMEORIGIN`, but Frigate can't tell the two apart from inside the container. `security_headers.conf` is a plain file in the image rather than a generated one, so anyone who does want framing restrictions can bind-mount it. `add_header` doesn't inherit into a block that declares its own, so the include goes in per block, all nine of them, including the four nested static-asset locations that serve the JS bundles. Those are the ones nosniff actually matters for. The run script now reads `get_nginx_settings.py` once into a variable instead of shelling out per template. That script imports the frigate config machinery, which is noticeable on an SBC. Not fixed here: `listen.conf` is included at server level and carries `Strict-Transport-Security`, so those same nine blocks already drop HSTS under TLS today. Folding it into this file would change existing TLS behavior on nine paths, so it needs its own PR. * Restrict go2rtc config file permissions * Log failed login attempts with source address Failed logins returned a bare 401 and left nothing behind, so credential stuffing was invisible unless you were already watching nginx access logs. Both failure branches now log a warning with the attempted username and the client address. The address comes from `get_remote_addr()`, the same helper the login rate limiter keys on, so the two agree on who the client is and the trusted-proxy handling is consistent. Logging a raw `x-forwarded-for` instead would let an attacker forge the source address in the very log line meant to catch them. The response is unchanged and identical either way. Which factor failed is only visible in the log, never to the client, and the password is never logged. * Recommend least-privilege container options in install docs The compose generator pushed `privileged: true` into every file it produced, no matter what hardware you picked, and it's the default tab on the install page so it's what most people copy. It now emits `security_opt: no-new-privileges:true` instead, and only adds `privileged: true` for hardware that actually needs it, with the reason inline. MemryX is the only one today, since it needs to reach the max-manager. Rockchip and Synaptics only want privileged during initial setup and their documented end state is device mappings, so neither gets it. `no-new-privileges` merges into the same `security_opt` block as any device-specific entries, so Rockchip still gets its `apparmor=unconfined` and `systempaths=unconfined` without a duplicate key. The static example now has `privileged` commented out, and there's a short section on the options worth adding, with a note that `cap_drop: ALL` breaks `telemetry.stats.network_bandwidth` since nethogs needs NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW. * Add amd64 container smoke test to CI Boots the built amd64 image against a minimal config and asserts the two security headers, that the Server header no longer carries a version, that no frame-ancestors is present, that nginx accepts its own config, and the two file modes. This is also the harness the rest of the hardening work extends. The two negative assertions are written as `if grep; then exit 1; fi` rather than `! grep`. Bash exempts a negated command from `set -e`, so the `!` form would have passed even with the version and frame-ancestors both present, which is the opposite of what a regression net is for. | 15 天前 | |
Container security hardening (phase 1) (#24061) * Verify s6-overlay downloads against pinned checksums * Verify go2rtc download against pinned checksums The v1.9.14 release publishes no checksums file, just the bare per-platform binaries, so these digests come from a one-time fetch rather than upstream. That pins the artifact against later substitution, which is the realistic threat for a version we stay on for months, but it does not verify the original download. The stage moves from `ADD --link` to a script because `ADD --checksum` can't express an architecture-dependent URL. * Verify main image downloads against pinned checksums Covers everything the main image downloads on the default path: tempio, the hailort runtime tarball and wheel, the six ffmpeg builds, the libedgetpu deb, and the thirteen Intel driver debs. The hailort tarball was streamed straight into `tar`, which can't be verified before extraction, so it downloads to `/tmp` first. The three ffmpeg blocks per arch collapse into one `install_ffmpeg` helper since they only differed by URL and install dir, and the Intel debs go through a `fetch_intel_deb` helper for the same reason. The Intel debs are the ones that mattered most here. They're installed as root with `dpkg` on the default amd64 path and had no verification at all. compute-runtime publishes a `ww<week>.sum` asset with every release and npu-driver published `checksum.sha256` on v1.19.0, so those eight digests came from upstream rather than from us. intel-graphics-compiler and level-zero publish none, so those five and everything else here come from a one-time fetch, which pins the artifact against later substitution but doesn't verify the original download. The comment above the map says which is which and how to refresh them, since npu-driver has stopped publishing sums since v1.19.0 and that provenance won't survive the next bump. Still unpinned: `get-pip.py`, which is a rolling URL where a digest would just break the build on pypa's next edit, and the per-variant artifacts for Axera, Synaptics, and Jetson. apt repositories are out of scope since apt already verifies signatures. * Restrict generated TLS key permissions OpenSSL 3.x already writes the key at 600 on its own, so this pins the guarantee rather than fixing an observed leak: the mode no longer depends on the openssl version or the umask the service happens to start with. Only the generated pair is touched. User-mounted certs take the other branch and are never chmod'd, which matters when they're mounted read-only. * Add security headers and server_tokens off Adds `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, and turns off nginx version disclosure. No `X-Frame-Options` and no CSP `frame-ancestors`. HA's Webpage card and iframe panels frame Frigate's own address cross-origin, and either header would break them silently with nothing in Frigate's logs to explain it. Ingress is same-origin and would survive `SAMEORIGIN`, but Frigate can't tell the two apart from inside the container. `security_headers.conf` is a plain file in the image rather than a generated one, so anyone who does want framing restrictions can bind-mount it. `add_header` doesn't inherit into a block that declares its own, so the include goes in per block, all nine of them, including the four nested static-asset locations that serve the JS bundles. Those are the ones nosniff actually matters for. The run script now reads `get_nginx_settings.py` once into a variable instead of shelling out per template. That script imports the frigate config machinery, which is noticeable on an SBC. Not fixed here: `listen.conf` is included at server level and carries `Strict-Transport-Security`, so those same nine blocks already drop HSTS under TLS today. Folding it into this file would change existing TLS behavior on nine paths, so it needs its own PR. * Restrict go2rtc config file permissions * Log failed login attempts with source address Failed logins returned a bare 401 and left nothing behind, so credential stuffing was invisible unless you were already watching nginx access logs. Both failure branches now log a warning with the attempted username and the client address. The address comes from `get_remote_addr()`, the same helper the login rate limiter keys on, so the two agree on who the client is and the trusted-proxy handling is consistent. Logging a raw `x-forwarded-for` instead would let an attacker forge the source address in the very log line meant to catch them. The response is unchanged and identical either way. Which factor failed is only visible in the log, never to the client, and the password is never logged. * Recommend least-privilege container options in install docs The compose generator pushed `privileged: true` into every file it produced, no matter what hardware you picked, and it's the default tab on the install page so it's what most people copy. It now emits `security_opt: no-new-privileges:true` instead, and only adds `privileged: true` for hardware that actually needs it, with the reason inline. MemryX is the only one today, since it needs to reach the max-manager. Rockchip and Synaptics only want privileged during initial setup and their documented end state is device mappings, so neither gets it. `no-new-privileges` merges into the same `security_opt` block as any device-specific entries, so Rockchip still gets its `apparmor=unconfined` and `systempaths=unconfined` without a duplicate key. The static example now has `privileged` commented out, and there's a short section on the options worth adding, with a note that `cap_drop: ALL` breaks `telemetry.stats.network_bandwidth` since nethogs needs NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW. * Add amd64 container smoke test to CI Boots the built amd64 image against a minimal config and asserts the two security headers, that the Server header no longer carries a version, that no frame-ancestors is present, that nginx accepts its own config, and the two file modes. This is also the harness the rest of the hardening work extends. The two negative assertions are written as `if grep; then exit 1; fi` rather than `! grep`. Bash exempts a negated command from `set -e`, so the `!` form would have passed even with the version and frame-ancestors both present, which is the opposite of what a regression net is for. | 15 天前 | |
fix mypy errors from types-peewee 4.0 (#24323) types-peewee 4.0 types model fields precisely, so 17 `type: ignore` comments and 2 `cast(str, ...)` calls are no longer needed. Its stubs type `.namedtuples()` and `.dicts()` queries as returning model instances, so the review cleanup reads namedtuple fields by name and the storage usage query casts its dict rows. `start_time` is declared `DateTimeField` but stores unix timestamps, so two reads cast it like `debug_replay.py` already does. `Export` gets an annotation for the `export_case_id` attribute peewee adds at runtime. | 13 天前 | |
Update OpenVINO model generation (#23733) | 2 个月前 | |
bump onnxruntime, ruamel, and argcomplete (#24460) | 3 天前 | |
Various fixes (#20666) * Remove nvidia pyindex * Improve prompt | 10 个月前 |
| 文件 | 最后提交记录 | 最后更新时间 |
|---|---|---|
| 6 天前 | ||
| 15 天前 | ||
| 5 个月前 | ||
| 15 天前 | ||
| 1 个月前 | ||
| 10 个月前 | ||
| 2 个月前 | ||
| 3 年前 | ||
| 15 天前 | ||
| 15 天前 | ||
| 15 天前 | ||
| 15 天前 | ||
| 13 天前 | ||
| 2 个月前 | ||
| 3 天前 | ||
| 10 个月前 |