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KEYS: asymmetric: Add missing dependencies of FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST commit 9d2fd8bdc12f403a5c35c971936a0e1d5cb5108e upstream. Since the signature self-test uses RSA and SHA-256, it must only be enabled when those algorithms are enabled. Otherwise it fails and panics the kernel on boot-up. Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202404221528.51d75177-lkp@intel.com Fixes: 3cde3174eb91 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 1 年前 | |
certs: Break circular dependency when selftest is modular [ Upstream commit 04a93202ed7c3b451bf22d3ff4bcd379df27f299 ] The modular build fails because the self-test code depends on pkcs7 which in turn depends on x509 which contains the self-test. Split the self-test out into its own module to break the cycle. Fixes: 3cde3174eb91 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> | 2 年前 | |
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 7 年前 | |
crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_id [ Upstream commit df0845cf447ae1556c3440b8b155de0926cbaa56 ] Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1 INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc. Fixes: 7901c1a8effb ("KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling") Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 5b8ac617c8dab5cad3c4dc8d84d0987808a0f99c) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 6 个月前 | |
pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing" data blob The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing" data blob as its signed content. This blob contains a digest of the signed content of the PE binary and the OID of the digest algorithm used (typically SHA256). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 11 年前 | |
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 7 年前 | |
PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then contributes to the signature. Further, we already require the master message content type to be pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1]. We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them entirely as appropriate. To this end: (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one that does not. (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them. Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are rejected: (a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the content type in the SignedData object. (b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data. (c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within the validity window of the matching X.509 cert. (d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents. (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents. (f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents. The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present. The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP). The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or if it contains more than one element in its set of values. (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers: (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal content. (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't remove these). (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when limiting the use of X.509 certs. (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between the above options for testing purposes. For example: echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7 will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE). Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> | 10 年前 | |
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 7 年前 | |
pkcs7: support EC-RDSA/streebog in SignerInfo Allow using EC-RDSA/streebog in pkcs7 certificates in a similar way to how it's done in the x509 parser. This is needed e.g. for loading kernel modules signed with EC-RDSA. Signed-off-by: Elvira Khabirova <e.khabirova@omp.ru> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> | 3 年前 | |
crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h Drop the doubled word "the" in a comment. Change "THis" to "This". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org | 5 年前 | |
keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID There are non-root X.509 v3 certificates in use out there that contain no Authority Key Identifier extension (RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1). For trust verification purposes the kernel asymmetric key type keeps two struct asymmetric_key_id instances that the key can be looked up by, and another two to look up the key's issuer. The x509 public key type and the PKCS7 type generate them from the SKID and AKID extensions in the certificate. In effect current code has no way to look up the issuer certificate for verification without the AKID. To remedy this, add a third asymmetric_key_id blob to the arrays in both asymmetric_key_id's (for certficate subject) and in the public_keys_signature's auth_ids (for issuer lookup), using just raw subject and issuer DNs from the certificate. Adapt asymmetric_key_ids() and its callers to use the third ID for lookups when none of the other two are available. Attempt to keep the logic intact when they are, to minimise behaviour changes. Adapt the restrict functions' NULL-checks to include that ID too. Do not modify the lookup logic in pkcs7_verify.c, the AKID extensions are still required there. Internally use a new "dn:" prefix to the search specifier string generated for the key lookup in find_asymmetric_key(). This tells asymmetric_key_match_preparse to only match the data against the raw DN in the third ID and shouldn't conflict with search specifiers already in use. In effect implement what (2) in the struct asymmetric_key_id comment (include/keys/asymmetric-type.h) is probably talking about already, so do not modify that comment. It is also how "openssl verify" looks up issuer certificates without the AKID available. Lookups by the raw DN are unambiguous only provided that the CAs respect the condition in RFC5280 4.2.1.1 that the AKID may only be omitted if the CA uses a single signing key. The following is an example of two things that this change enables. A self-signed ceritficate is generated following the example from https://letsencrypt.org/docs/certificates-for-localhost/, and can be looked up by an identifier and verified against itself by linking to a restricted keyring -- both things not possible before due to the missing AKID extension: $ openssl req -x509 -out localhost.crt -outform DER -keyout localhost.key \ -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -sha256 \ -subj '/CN=localhost' -extensions EXT -config <( \ echo -e "[dn]\nCN=localhost\n[req]\ndistinguished_name = dn\n[EXT]\n" \ "subjectAltName=DNS:localhost\nkeyUsage=digitalSignature\n" \ "extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth") $ keyring= keyctl newring test @u $ trusted=keyctl padd asymmetric trusted $keyring < localhost.crt; \ echo $trusted 39726322 $ keyctl search $keyring asymmetric dn:3112301006035504030c096c6f63616c686f7374 39726322 $ keyctl restrict_keyring $keyring asymmetric key_or_keyring:$trusted $ keyctl padd asymmetric verified $keyring < localhost.crt Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> | 4 年前 | |
asymmetric_keys: log on fatal failures in PE/pkcs7 These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when secureboot lockdown is in place. Without this change, even with a signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the appropriate dyndbg parameters (since lockdown blocks debugfs). Accordingly, upgrade all pr_debug() before fatal error into pr_warn(). Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220171254.592347-3-rharwood@redhat.com/ # v2 | 3 年前 | |
KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2] Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key format [RFC 5208] parser for the asymmetric key type. For the moment, this will only support unencrypted DER blobs. PEM and decryption can be added later. PKCS#8 keys can be loaded like this: openssl pkcs8 -in private_key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | \ keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> | 7 年前 | |
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 7 年前 | |
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix sign/verify on pkcs1pad without a hash The new sign/verify code broke the case of pkcs1pad without a hash algorithm. Fix it by setting issig correctly for this case. Fixes: 63ba4d67594a ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5 Reported-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2 年前 | |
KEYS: DigitalSignature link restriction Add a new link restriction. Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring based on the key having digitalSignature usage set. Additionally, verify the new certificate against the ones in the system keyrings. Add two additional functions to use the new restriction within either the builtin or secondary keyrings. [jarkko@kernel.org: Fix checkpatch.pl --strict issues] Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> | 2 年前 | |
certs: Break circular dependency when selftest is modular [ Upstream commit 04a93202ed7c3b451bf22d3ff4bcd379df27f299 ] The modular build fails because the self-test code depends on pkcs7 which in turn depends on x509 which contains the self-test. Split the self-test out into its own module to break the cycle. Fixes: 3cde3174eb91 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> | 2 年前 | |
crypto: cleanup comments For spdx /* */ for *.h, // for *.c Space before spdx tag Replacements paramenters to parameters aymmetric to asymmetric sigature to signature boudary to boundary compliled to compiled eninges to engines explicity to explicitly Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 4 年前 | |
KEYS: fix kernel-doc warnings in verify_pefile Fix kernel-doc warnings in verify_pefile: crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:423: warning: Excess function parameter 'trust_keys' description in 'verify_pefile_signature' crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:423: warning: Function parameter or member 'trusted_keys' not described in 'verify_pefile_signature' Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2 年前 | |
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 7 年前 | |
KEYS: x509: clearly distinguish between key and signature algorithms An X.509 certificate has two, potentially different public key algorithms: the one used by the certificate's key, and the one that was used to sign the certificate. Some of the naming made it unclear which algorithm was meant. Rename things appropriately: - x509_note_pkey_algo() => x509_note_sig_algo() - algo_oid => sig_algo Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> | 4 年前 | |
X.509: Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier, not just the keyIdentifier, as the second part can be used to match X.509 certificates by issuer and serialNumber. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> | 10 年前 | |
X.509: Fix out-of-bounds access when parsing extensions commit d702c3408213bb12bd570bb97204d8340d141c51 upstream. Leo reports an out-of-bounds access when parsing a certificate with empty Basic Constraints or Key Usage extension because the first byte of the extension is read before checking its length. Fix it. The bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user by submitting a specially crafted certificate to the kernel through the keyrings(7) API. Leo has demonstrated this with a proof-of-concept program responsibly disclosed off-list. Fixes: 30eae2b037af ("KEYS: X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA") Fixes: 567671281a75 ("KEYS: X.509: Parse Key Usage") Reported-by: Leo Lin <leo@depthfirst.com> # off-list Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.4+ Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 672b526def1f94c1be8eb11b885b803da0d8c2f1) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 2 个月前 | |
wifi: cfg80211: Deduplicate certificate loading load_keys_from_buffer() in net/wireless/reg.c duplicates x509_load_certificate_list() in crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c for no apparent reason. Deduplicate it. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e7280be84acda02634bc7cb52c97656182b9c700.1673197326.git.lukas@wunner.de Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> | 3 年前 | |
certs: Break circular dependency when selftest is modular [ Upstream commit 04a93202ed7c3b451bf22d3ff4bcd379df27f299 ] The modular build fails because the self-test code depends on pkcs7 which in turn depends on x509 which contains the self-test. Split the self-test out into its own module to break the cycle. Fixes: 3cde3174eb91 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> | 2 年前 | |
certs: Break circular dependency when selftest is modular [ Upstream commit 04a93202ed7c3b451bf22d3ff4bcd379df27f299 ] The modular build fails because the self-test code depends on pkcs7 which in turn depends on x509 which contains the self-test. Split the self-test out into its own module to break the cycle. Fixes: 3cde3174eb91 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> | 2 年前 |
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