| 文件 | 最后提交记录 | 最后更新时间 |
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fs: Add notification mechanism for read-only filesystem errors This patch introduces an error notification mechanism specifically targeting OverlayFS, designed to send EROFS error notifications to userspace. Key features: * Adds the CONFIG_DEEPIN_ERR_NOTIFY configuration option, allowing the notification system to be enabled or disabled at compile time. * Implements the notification mechanism based on netlink, using the Generic Netlink protocol family to deliver error details to userspace applications. * Provides runtime control via the /proc/sys/fs/deepin-err-notify-enable sysctl interface. * Integrates EROFS error detection into critical system calls, including: - File operations: open, truncate, chmod, chown, utime - Directory operations: mkdir, rmdir, mknod - Link operations: link, symlink, unlink, rename - Extended attribute operations: setxattr, removexattr - I/O control operations: ioctl * Adds the deepin_err_notify mount option for overlayFS, enabling selective activation of the error notification feature. * Includes rate-limiting mechanisms to prevent notification flooding. * Provides detailed contextual information in notifications, including filename, process ID, process name, and function name. This feature is particularly useful for monitoring failed modification attempts by applications targeting the /usr directory on immutable systems. Signed-off-by: electricface <songwentai@uniontech.com> | 10 个月前 | |
ovl: modify layer parameter parsing We ran into issues where mount(8) passed multiple lower layers as one big string through fsconfig(). But the fsconfig() FSCONFIG_SET_STRING option is limited to 256 bytes in strndup_user(). While this would be fixable by extending the fsconfig() buffer I'd rather encourage users to append layers via multiple fsconfig() calls as the interface allows nicely for this. This has also been requested as a feature before. With this port to the new mount api the following will be possible: fsconfig(fs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "lowerdir", "/lower1", 0); /* set upper layer */ fsconfig(fs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "upperdir", "/upper", 0); /* append "/lower2", "/lower3", and "/lower4" */ fsconfig(fs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "lowerdir", ":/lower2:/lower3:/lower4", 0); /* turn index feature on */ fsconfig(fs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "index", "on", 0); /* append "/lower5" */ fsconfig(fs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "lowerdir", ":/lower5", 0); Specifying ':' would have been rejected so this isn't a regression. And we can't simply use "lowerdir=/lower" to append on top of existing layers as "lowerdir=/lower,lowerdir=/other-lower" would make "/other-lower" the only lower layer so we'd break uapi if we changed this. So the ':' prefix seems a good compromise. Users can choose to specify multiple layers at once or individual layers. A layer is appended if it starts with ":". This requires that the user has already added at least one layer before. If lowerdir is specified again without a leading ":" then all previous layers are dropped and replaced with the new layers. If lowerdir is specified and empty than all layers are simply dropped. An additional change is that overlayfs will now parse and resolve layers right when they are specified in fsconfig() instead of deferring until super block creation. This allows users to receive early errors. It also allows users to actually use up to 500 layers something which was theoretically possible but ended up not working due to the mount option string passed via mount(2) being too large. This also allows a more privileged process to set config options for a lesser privileged process as the creds for fsconfig() and the creds for fsopen() can differ. We could restrict that they match by enforcing that the creds of fsopen() and fsconfig() match but I don't see why that needs to be the case and allows for a good delegation mechanism. Plus, in the future it means we're able to extend overlayfs mount options and allow users to specify layers via file descriptors instead of paths: fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_PATH{_EMPTY}, "lowerdir", "lower1", dirfd); /* append */ fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_PATH{_EMPTY}, "lowerdir", "lower2", dirfd); /* append */ fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_PATH{_EMPTY}, "lowerdir", "lower3", dirfd); /* clear all layers specified until now */ fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "lowerdir", NULL, 0); This would be especially nice if users create an overlayfs mount on top of idmapped layers or just in general private mounts created via open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE). Those mounts would then never have to appear anywhere in the filesystem. But for now just do the minimal thing. We should probably aim to move more validation into ovl_fs_parse_param() so users get errors before fsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE). But that can be done in additional patches later. This is now also rebased on top of the lazy lowerdata lookup which allows the specificatin of data only layers using the new "::" syntax. The rules are simple. A data only layers cannot be followed by any regular layers and data layers must be preceeded by at least one regular layer. Parsing the lowerdir mount option must change because of this. The original patchset used the old lowerdir parsing function to split a lowerdir mount option string such as: lowerdir=/lower1:/lower2::/lower3::/lower4 simply replacing each non-escaped ":" by "\0". So sequences of non-escaped ":" were counted as layers. For example, the previous lowerdir mount option above would've counted 6 layers instead of 4 and a lowerdir mount option such as: lowerdir="/lower1:/lower2::/lower3::/lower4:::::::::::::::::::::::::::" would be counted as 33 layers. Other than being ugly this didn't matter much because kern_path() would reject the first "\0" layer. However, this overcounting of layers becomes problematic when we base allocations on it where we very much only want to allocate space for 4 layers instead of 33. So the new parsing function rejects non-escaped sequences of colons other than ":" and "::" immediately instead of relying on kern_path(). Link: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/issues/2287 Link: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/issues/1992 Link: https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/78702 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/20230530-klagen-zudem-32c0908c2108@brauner Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> | 3 年前 | |
ovl: use linked upper dentry in copy-up tmpfile [ Upstream commit e348eecd4d8fa8d18a5157ff59f7be1dc59c5928 ] ovl_copy_up_tmpfile() stores the disconnected O_TMPFILE dentry as the overlay's upper dentry reference via ovl_inode_update(). vfs_tmpfile() allocated this dentry via d_alloc(parentpath->dentry, &slash_name), so d_name is "/" and d_parent is c->workdir. Local upper filesystems (ext4, btrfs, xfs, ...) immediately rename it to "#<inum>" via d_mark_tmpfile() inside their ->tmpfile() op; FUSE and virtiofs do not, so both fields stay that way. Neither identifies the destination directory and filename where ovl_do_link() actually linked the file. When the upper filesystem implements ->d_revalidate() (e.g. FUSE or virtiofs), ovl_revalidate_real() calls it with the dentry's parent inode and a snapshot of d_name. The server tries to look up "/" inside c->workdir, fails, and overlayfs reports -ESTALE. This causes persistent ESTALE errors for any file that was copied up via the tmpfile path, breaking dpkg, apt, and other tools that do rename-over-existing on overlayfs with a FUSE/virtiofs upper. Before commit 6b52243f633e ("ovl: fold copy-up helpers into callers"), the tmpfile copy-up path used a dedicated helper ovl_link_tmpfile() that captured the linked destination dentry returned by ovl_do_link(): err = ovl_do_link(temp, udir, upper); ... if (!err) *newdentry = dget(upper); and published it via ovl_inode_update(d_inode(c->dentry), newdentry). The fold inlined ovl_do_link() into ovl_copy_up_tmpfile() but dropped the dget(upper) capture, and rewrote the publish line as ovl_inode_update(d_inode(c->dentry), dget(temp)) — where temp is the disconnected O_TMPFILE dentry. Fix by keeping a reference to the linked destination dentry after ovl_do_link() succeeds, and publishing that dentry at the existing ovl_inode_update() call site. The non-tmpfile/workdir path continues to publish the renamed temporary dentry. Reproducer: - Mount overlayfs with virtiofs (or a FUSE fs whose server advertises FUSE_TMPFILE) as upper - Run: dpkg -i <any .deb> - Observe: "error installing new file '...': Stale file handle" Fixes: 6b52243f633e ("ovl: fold copy-up helpers into callers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Souvik Banerjee <souvik@amlalabs.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501232735.2610824-1-souvik@amlalabs.com Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> [ adapted scoped credential and creation helpers to explicit credential, locking, lookup, and cleanup handling ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 45ead2e598cc87b16127638b6e7de9888eca49dc) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 1 个月前 | |
HAOC: Add support for x86 CRED Protection (CREDP). Add support for x86 CRED Protection (CREDP) in deepin kernel. Signed-off-by: Liu Zhehui <liuzhh@zgclab.edu.cn> | 1 年前 | |
ovl: support encoding fid from inode with no alias commit c45beebfde34aa71afbc48b2c54cdda623515037 upstream. Dmitry Safonov reported that a WARN_ON() assertion can be trigered by userspace when calling inotify_show_fdinfo() for an overlayfs watched inode, whose dentry aliases were discarded with drop_caches. The WARN_ON() assertion in inotify_show_fdinfo() was removed, because it is possible for encoding file handle to fail for other reason, but the impact of failing to encode an overlayfs file handle goes beyond this assertion. As shown in the LTP test case mentioned in the link below, failure to encode an overlayfs file handle from a non-aliased inode also leads to failure to report an fid with FAN_DELETE_SELF fanotify events. As Dmitry notes in his analyzis of the problem, ovl_encode_fh() fails if it cannot find an alias for the inode, but this failure can be fixed. ovl_encode_fh() seldom uses the alias and in the case of non-decodable file handles, as is often the case with fanotify fid info, ovl_encode_fh() never needs to use the alias to encode a file handle. Defer finding an alias until it is actually needed so ovl_encode_fh() will not fail in the common case of FAN_DELETE_SELF fanotify events. Fixes: 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support encoding non-decodable file handles") Reported-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAOQ4uxiie81voLZZi2zXS1BziXZCM24nXqPAxbu8kxXCUWdwOg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250105162404.357058-3-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit f0c0ac84de17c37e6e84da65fb920f91dada55ad) | 1 年前 | |
lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks [ Upstream commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 ] Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the mmap() and mprotect() operations. In order to resolve this gap, a LSM security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following new LSM hooks are being created: security_backing_file_alloc() security_backing_file_free() security_mmap_backing_file() The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access control point for the underlying backing file. It is also expected that LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook. There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks: * Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the security_backing_file_alloc() hook. * Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c. * Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into the common LSM audit code. Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() and supplying a fixup. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> [1. Mainline uses call_int_hook(FUNC, ...) with the default IRC baked into the macro. Linux 6.6.y uses call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) requiring an explicit default return value. 2. fs/backing-file.c does not exist in LTS Linux 6.6.y places backing_file_open() in fs/open.c and lacks a dedicated fs/backing-file.c. The backing_file_mmap() function and scoped_with_creds() do not exist in 6.6.y. Therefore the LTS patch calls security_mmap_backing_file() directly in ovl_mmap() in fs/overlayfs/file.c rather than modifying backing_file_mmap(). 3. Missing filesystems/modules Linux 6.6.y does not have backing_tmpfile_open(), fs/fuse/passthrough.c, or the erofs ishare mmap path that the mainline patch touches. These hunks are dropped in the 6.6 LTS backport. 4. Use macro backing_file to replace inline function to eliminate the const warning.] Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/internal.h (cherry picked from commit 41c5b269af8b1f0bffcab7766a793f294ae6764e) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 2 个月前 | |
ovl: properly handle large files in ovl_security_fileattr commit 3b6b99ef15ea37635604992ede9ebcccef38a239 upstream. dentry_open in ovl_security_fileattr fails for any file larger than 2GB if open method of the underlying filesystem calls generic_file_open (e.g. fusefs). The issue can be reproduce using the following script: (passthrough_ll is an example app from libfuse). $ D=/opt/test/mnt $ mkdir -p ${D}/{source,base,top/uppr,top/work,ovlfs} $ dd if=/dev/zero of=${D}/source/zero.bin bs=1G count=2 $ passthrough_ll -o source=${D}/source ${D}/base $ mount -t overlay overlay \ -olowerdir=${D}/base,upperdir=${D}/top/uppr,workdir=${D}/top/work \ ${D}/ovlfs $ chmod 0777 ${D}/mnt/ovlfs/zero.bin Running this script results in "Value too large for defined data type" error message from chmod. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com> Fixes: 72db82115d2b ("ovl: copy up sync/noatime fileattr flags") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+ Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit c5f4540ae66ed39fb7eafbc1b22bfdafa3e830de) | 1 年前 | |
ovl: pass realinode to ovl_encode_real_fh() instead of realdentry commit 07aeefae7ff44d80524375253980b1bdee2396b0 upstream. We want to be able to encode an fid from an inode with no alias. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250105162404.357058-2-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: c45beebfde34 ("ovl: support encoding fid from inode with no alias") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> [re-applied over v6.6.71 with conflict resolved] Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 955a355e179f0d9694eea797ce9171e23589882b) | 1 年前 | |
ovl: remove unused forward declaration [ Upstream commit a6eb9a4a69cc360b930dad9dc8513f8fd9b3577f ] The ovl_get_verity_xattr() function was never added, only its declaration. Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> Fixes: 184996e92e86 ("ovl: Validate verity xattr when resolving lowerdata") Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 4f7b6029ae8e22169c8a002ca0431865e63011c5) | 1 年前 | |
refactor(overlayfs): remove code and configurations related to deepin_err_notify Clean up all conditional compilation code related to CONFIG_DEEPIN_ERR_NOTIFY Signed-off-by: electricface <songwentai@uniontech.com> | 9 个月前 | |
refactor(overlayfs): remove code and configurations related to deepin_err_notify Clean up all conditional compilation code related to CONFIG_DEEPIN_ERR_NOTIFY Signed-off-by: electricface <songwentai@uniontech.com> | 9 个月前 | |
ovl: store and show the user provided lowerdir mount option [ Upstream commit 0cea4c097d97fdc89de488bd4202d0b087ccec58 ] We are about to add new mount options for adding lowerdir one by one, but those mount options will not support escaping. For the existing case, where lowerdir mount option is provided as a colon separated list, store the user provided (possibly escaped) string and display it as is when showing the lowerdir mount option. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Stable-dep-of: 2824083db76c ("ovl: Always reject mounting over case-insensitive directories") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> | 2 年前 | |
ovl: Fix uninit-value in ovl_fill_real [ Upstream commit 1992330d90dd766fcf1730fd7bf2d6af65370ac4 ] Syzbot reported a KMSAN uninit-value issue in ovl_fill_real. This iusse's call chain is: __do_sys_getdents64() -> iterate_dir() ... -> ext4_readdir() -> fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer() // alloc -> fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr // write without tail '\0' -> dir_emit() -> ovl_fill_real() // read by strcmp() The string is used to store the decrypted directory entry name for an encrypted inode. As shown in the call chain, fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr() write it without null-terminate. However, ovl_fill_real() uses strcmp() to compare the name against "..", which assumes a null-terminated string and may trigger a KMSAN uninit-value warning when the buffer tail contains uninit data. Reported-by: syzbot+d130f98b2c265fae5297@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d130f98b2c265fae5297 Fixes: 4edb83bb1041 ("ovl: constant d_ino for non-merge dirs") Signed-off-by: Qing Wang <wangqing7171@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260128132406.23768-2-amir73il@gmail.com Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 43b6f69e18063ae01911990f8726e9927e070ebf) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 5 个月前 | |
ovl: don't warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace commit 63981fc786daaa626cb14d9be1406f674d79f98f upstream. fsopen() records the caller's user namespace in fc->user_ns and hands back an ordinary file descriptor. Nothing ties the task that calls fsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) to the task that created the context. The fd is inherited across fork() and exec() and it can be passed over a unix socket. Completing a context from another user namespace is allowed on purpose. vfs_cmd_create() authorizes the create with mount_capable(), which for FS_USERNS_MOUNT checks ns_capable(fc->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and that succeeds for a task holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an ancestor of fc->user_ns. So an unprivileged task can reach the WARN_ON() in ovl_fill_super(): create a user and a mount namespace in a child, call fsopen("overlay") there, send the fscontext fd to the parent and let the parent issue FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE. Both namespaces come from a plain unshare(1) and no capability is needed anywhere: WARNING: fs/overlayfs/super.c:1551 at ovl_fill_super+0x7b9/0x1e20 [overlay] CPU: 3 UID: 1000 PID: 3243376 Comm: fswarn Call Trace: get_tree_nodev+0x71/0xa0 ovl_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [overlay] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100 vfs_cmd_create+0x60/0xf0 __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4b2/0x500 The child needs the mount namespace because fsopen() itself gates on may_mount(), which asks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user namespace owning the caller's mount namespace. fsconfig() doesn't repeat that check. It is a WARN_ON() and not a WARN_ON_ONCE(), so the condition can be raised in a loop to taint the kernel and flood the log, and it panics a kernel booted with panic_on_warn. Keep refusing the mount and stop warning about it. ovl_parse_param() already spells a user namespace check this way for Opt_override_creds. Fixes: 1784fbc2ed9c ("ovl: port to new mount api") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260802-work-fill_super-warn-v1-1-4e987911a39a@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 513478092966dc9818d96dd2b3ed613fd2f6e30e) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 21 天前 | |
ovl: Check for NULL d_inode() in ovl_dentry_upper() [ Upstream commit 8a39f1c870e9d6fbac5638f3a42a6a6363829c49 ] In ovl_path_type() and ovl_is_metacopy_dentry() GCC notices that it is possible for OVL_E() to return NULL (which implies that d_inode(dentry) may be NULL). This would result in out of bounds reads via container_of(), seen with GCC 15's -Warray-bounds -fdiagnostics-details. For example: In file included from arch/x86/include/generated/asm/rwonce.h:1, from include/linux/compiler.h:339, from include/linux/export.h:5, from include/linux/linkage.h:7, from include/linux/fs.h:5, from fs/overlayfs/util.c:7: In function 'ovl_upperdentry_dereference', inlined from 'ovl_dentry_upper' at ../fs/overlayfs/util.c:305:9, inlined from 'ovl_path_type' at ../fs/overlayfs/util.c:216:6: include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:44:26: error: array subscript 0 is outside array bounds of 'struct inode[7486503276667837]' [-Werror=array-bounds=] 44 | #define __READ_ONCE(x) (*(const volatile __unqual_scalar_typeof(x) *)&(x)) | ~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:50:9: note: in expansion of macro '__READ_ONCE' 50 | __READ_ONCE(x); \ | ^~~~~~~~~~~ fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h:195:16: note: in expansion of macro 'READ_ONCE' 195 | return READ_ONCE(oi->__upperdentry); | ^~~~~~~~~ 'ovl_path_type': event 1 185 | return inode ? OVL_I(inode)->oe : NULL; 'ovl_path_type': event 2 Avoid this by allowing ovl_dentry_upper() to return NULL if d_inode() is NULL, as that means the problematic dereferencing can never be reached. Note that this fixes the over-eager compiler warning in an effort to being able to enable -Warray-bounds globally. There is no known behavioral bug here. Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 2cbeb47ea983cb79ca6464c5fd1abcb1372a7532) | 1 年前 |