From a91e537d16d74050dbde50bb0dfb1fe9930f0521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Igor Ustinov <igus68@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2026 08:16:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Avoid possible buffer overflow in buf2hex conversion
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Fixes CVE-2026-31789

Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.foundation>
MergeDate: Mon Apr  6 19:41:24 2026
---
 crypto/o_str.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/o_str.c b/crypto/o_str.c
index d7090acef45ba..1e62f5b51159d 100644
--- a/crypto/o_str.c
+++ b/crypto/o_str.c
@@ -236,4 +236,9 @@ static int buf2hexstr_sep(char *str, size_t str_n, size_t *strlength,
     int has_sep = (sep != CH_ZERO);
     size_t len = has_sep ? buflen * 3 : 1 + buflen * 2;
 
+    if (buflen > (has_sep ? SIZE_MAX / 3 : (SIZE_MAX - 1) / 2)) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_TOO_MANY_BYTES);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (strlength != NULL)
@@ -277,10 +282,18 @@ char *ossl_buf2hexstr_sep(const unsigned char *buf, long buflen, char sep)
     char *tmp;
     size_t tmp_n;
 
+    if (buflen < 0)
+        return NULL;
     if (buflen == 0)
         return OPENSSL_zalloc(1);
 
-    tmp_n = (sep != CH_ZERO) ? buflen * 3 : 1 + buflen * 2;
+    if ((sep != CH_ZERO && (size_t)buflen > SIZE_MAX / 3)
+        || (sep == CH_ZERO && (size_t)buflen > (SIZE_MAX - 1) / 2)) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_TOO_MANY_BYTES);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    tmp_n = (sep != CH_ZERO) ? (size_t)buflen * 3 : 1 + (size_t)buflen * 2;
     if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_n)) == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return NULL;