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treewide: replace '---help---' in Kconfig files with 'help' Since commit 84af7a6194e4 ("checkpatch: kconfig: prefer 'help' over '---help---'"), the number of '---help---' has been gradually decreasing, but there are still more than 2400 instances. This commit finishes the conversion. While I touched the lines, I also fixed the indentation. There are a variety of indentation styles found. a) 4 spaces + '---help---' b) 7 spaces + '---help---' c) 8 spaces + '---help---' d) 1 space + 1 tab + '---help---' e) 1 tab + '---help---' (correct indentation) f) 1 tab + 1 space + '---help---' g) 1 tab + 2 spaces + '---help---' In order to convert all of them to 1 tab + 'help', I ran the following commend: $ find . -name 'Kconfig*' | xargs sed -i 's/^[[:space:]]*---help---/\thelp/' Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> | 5 年前 | |
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink policy to userspace, including all the range validation data, nested policies etc. This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands. For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now. The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we might want to just use the range data for example. Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_* values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as with min/max length we don't need to have different types here for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set. Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here. Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely. To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in exactly the same way, but is exposed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 6 年前 | |
netlink: annotate lockless accesses to nlk->max_recvmsg_len commit a1865f2e7d10dde00d35a2122b38d2e469ae67ed upstream. syzbot reported a data-race in data-race in netlink_recvmsg() [1] Indeed, netlink_recvmsg() can be run concurrently, and netlink_dump() also needs protection. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_recvmsg / netlink_recvmsg read to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23057 on cpu 0: netlink_recvmsg+0xea/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline] __sys_recvfrom+0x1ee/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2194 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2212 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2208 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2208 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd write to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23037 on cpu 1: netlink_recvmsg+0x114/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1989 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline] ____sys_recvmsg+0x156/0x310 net/socket.c:2720 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x2e5/0x710 net/socket.c:2856 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:2951 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000001000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00195-g5a57b48fdfcb #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023 Fixes: 9063e21fb026 ("netlink: autosize skb lengthes") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230403214643.768555-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: llj123 <luojie119@h-partners.com> | 1 个月前 | |
netlink: terminate outstanding dump on socket close mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12 commit 1904fb9ebf911441f90a68e96b22aa73e4410505 category: bugfix issue: NA CVE: CVE-2024-53140 Signed-off-by: wukuan <wukuan6@huawei.com> --------------------------------------- Netlink supports iterative dumping of data. It provides the families the following ops: - start - (optional) kicks off the dumping process - dump - actual dump helper, keeps getting called until it returns 0 - done - (optional) pairs with .start, can be used for cleanup The whole process is asynchronous and the repeated calls to .dump don't actually happen in a tight loop, but rather are triggered in response to recvmsg() on the socket. This gives the user full control over the dump, but also means that the user can close the socket without getting to the end of the dump. To make sure .start is always paired with .done we check if there is an ongoing dump before freeing the socket, and if so call .done. The complication is that sockets can get freed from BH and .done is allowed to sleep. So we use a workqueue to defer the call, when needed. Unfortunately this does not work correctly. What we defer is not the cleanup but rather releasing a reference on the socket. We have no guarantee that we own the last reference, if someone else holds the socket they may release it in BH and we're back to square one. The whole dance, however, appears to be unnecessary. Only the user can interact with dumps, so we can clean up when socket is closed. And close always happens in process context. Some async code may still access the socket after close, queue notification skbs to it etc. but no dumps can start, end or otherwise make progress. Delete the workqueue and flush the dump state directly from the release handler. Note that further cleanup is possible in -next, for instance we now always call .done before releasing the main module reference, so dump doesn't have to take a reference of its own. Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: ed5d7788a934 ("netlink: Do not schedule work from sk_destruct") Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241106015235.2458807-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: wukuan <wukuan6@huawei.com> | 1 年前 | |
netlink: Add __sock_i_ino() for __netlink_diag_dump(). stable inclusion from stable-5.10.188 commit 472a615e66b9b4c7d631f8d493553f035c9d96de category: bugfix issue: #I94FA1 CVE: NA Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing <wanxiaoqing@huawei.com> --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 25a9c8a4431c364f97f75558cb346d2ad3f53fbb ] syzbot reported a warning in __local_bh_enable_ip(). [0] Commit 8d61f926d420 ("netlink: fix potential deadlock in netlink_set_err()") converted read_lock(&nl_table_lock) to read_lock_irqsave() in __netlink_diag_dump() to prevent a deadlock. However, __netlink_diag_dump() calls sock_i_ino() that uses read_lock_bh() and read_unlock_bh(). If CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=y, read_unlock_bh() finally enables IRQ even though it should stay disabled until the following read_unlock_irqrestore(). Using read_lock() in sock_i_ino() would trigger a lockdep splat in another place that was fixed in commit f064af1e500a ("net: fix a lockdep splat"), so let's add __sock_i_ino() that would be safe to use under BH disabled. [0]: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5012 at kernel/softirq.c:376 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xbe/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:376 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 5012 Comm: syz-executor487 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-syzkaller-00202-g6f68fc395f49 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023 RIP: 0010:__local_bh_enable_ip+0xbe/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:376 Code: 45 bf 01 00 00 00 e8 91 5b 0a 00 e8 3c 15 3d 00 fb 65 8b 05 ec e9 b5 7e 85 c0 74 58 5b 5d c3 65 8b 05 b2 b6 b4 7e 85 c0 75 a2 <0f> 0b eb 9e e8 89 15 3d 00 eb 9f 48 89 ef e8 6f 49 18 00 eb a8 0f RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a1f3d0 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000201 RCX: 1ffffffff1cf5996 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: ffffffff8805c6f3 RBP: ffffffff8805c6f3 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880152b03a3 R10: ffffed1002a56074 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 00000000000073e4 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000555556726300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 000000007c646000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> sock_i_ino+0x83/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2559 __netlink_diag_dump+0x45c/0x790 net/netlink/diag.c:171 netlink_diag_dump+0xd6/0x230 net/netlink/diag.c:207 netlink_dump+0x570/0xc50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269 __netlink_dump_start+0x64b/0x910 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2374 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:329 [inline] netlink_diag_handler_dump+0x1ae/0x250 net/netlink/diag.c:238 __sock_diag_cmd net/core/sock_diag.c:238 [inline] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x31e/0x440 net/core/sock_diag.c:269 netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2547 sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x547/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365 netlink_sendmsg+0x925/0xe30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1914 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 net/socket.c:747 ____sys_sendmsg+0x71c/0x900 net/socket.c:2503 ___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2557 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2586 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f5303aaabb9 Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc7506e548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5303aaabb9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f5303a6ed60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f5303a6edf0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Fixes: 8d61f926d420 ("netlink: fix potential deadlock in netlink_set_err()") Reported-by: syzbot+5da61cf6a9bc1902d422@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5da61cf6a9bc1902d422 Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230626164313.52528-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing <wanxiaoqing@huawei.com> | 2 年前 | |
drop_monitor: Require 'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' when joining "events" group stable inclusion from stable-5.10.204 commit e844a9309f517c2b4c2a8a4a5ebfc31f0d6648c6 category: bugfix issue: #IAC98T CVE: NA Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing <wanxiaoqing@huawei.com> --------------------------------------- commit e03781879a0d524ce3126678d50a80484a513c4b upstream. The "NET_DM" generic netlink family notifies drop locations over the "events" multicast group. This is problematic since by default generic netlink allows non-root users to listen to these notifications. Fix by adding a new field to the generic netlink multicast group structure that when set prevents non-root users or root without the 'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' capability (in the user namespace owning the network namespace) from joining the group. Set this field for the "events" group. Use 'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' rather than 'CAP_NET_ADMIN' because of the nature of the information that is shared over this group. Note that the capability check in this case will always be performed against the initial user namespace since the family is not netns aware and only operates in the initial network namespace. A new field is added to the structure rather than using the "flags" field because the existing field uses uAPI flags and it is inappropriate to add a new uAPI flag for an internal kernel check. In net-next we can rework the "flags" field to use internal flags and fold the new field into it. But for now, in order to reduce the amount of changes, add a new field. Since the information can only be consumed by root, mark the control plane operations that start and stop the tracing as root-only using the 'GENL_ADMIN_PERM' flag. Tested using [1]. Before: # capsh -- -c ./dm_repo # capsh --drop=cap_sys_admin -- -c ./dm_repo After: # capsh -- -c ./dm_repo # capsh --drop=cap_sys_admin -- -c ./dm_repo Failed to join "events" multicast group [1] $ cat dm.c #include <stdio.h> #include <netlink/genl/ctrl.h> #include <netlink/genl/genl.h> #include <netlink/socket.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct nl_sock *sk; int grp, err; sk = nl_socket_alloc(); if (!sk) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate socket\n"); return -1; } err = genl_connect(sk); if (err) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect socket\n"); return err; } grp = genl_ctrl_resolve_grp(sk, "NET_DM", "events"); if (grp < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to resolve \"events\" multicast group\n"); return grp; } err = nl_socket_add_memberships(sk, grp, NFNLGRP_NONE); if (err) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to join \"events\" multicast group\n"); return err; } return 0; } $ gcc -I/usr/include/libnl3 -lnl-3 -lnl-genl-3 -o dm_repo dm.c Fixes: 9a8afc8d3962 ("Network Drop Monitor: Adding drop monitor implementation & Netlink protocol") Reported-by: "The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)" <security@ncsc.gov.uk> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206213102.1824398-3-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing <wanxiaoqing@huawei.com> | 1 年前 | |
net: genl: fix error path memory leak in policy dumping stable inclusion from stable-5.10.138 commit 83411c9f05d5a8b637293b3389eca3d378197c04 category: bugfix issue: #I4UU4A CVE: NA Signed-off-by: lizongfeng <lizongfeng1@huawei.com> --------------------------------------- commit 249801360db3dec4f73768c502192020bfddeacc upstream. If construction of the array of policies fails when recording non-first policy we need to unwind. netlink_policy_dump_add_policy() itself also needs fixing as it currently gives up on error without recording the allocated pointer in the pstate pointer. Reported-by: syzbot+dc54d9ba8153b216cae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 50a896cf2d6f ("genetlink: properly support per-op policy dumping") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220816161939.577583-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: lizongfeng <lizongfeng1@huawei.com> | 3 年前 |
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