| 文件 | 最后提交记录 | 最后更新时间 |
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fsverity: improve documentation for builtin signature support fsverity builtin signatures (CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) aren't the only way to do signatures with fsverity, and they have some major limitations. Yet, more users have tried to use them, e.g. recently by https://github.com/ostreedev/ostree/pull/2640. In most cases this seems to be because users aren't sufficiently familiar with the limitations of this feature and what the alternatives are. Therefore, make some updates to the documentation to try to clarify the properties of this feature and nudge users in the right direction. Note that the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM, which is not yet upstream, is planned to use the builtin signatures. (This differs from IMA, which uses its own signature mechanism.) For that reason, my earlier patch "fsverity: mark builtin signatures as deprecated" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221208033548.122704-1-ebiggers@kernel.org), which marked builtin signatures as "deprecated", was controversial. This patch therefore stops short of marking the feature as deprecated. I've also revised the language to focus on better explaining the feature and what its alternatives are. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230620041937.5809-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> Reviewed-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 3 年前 | |
fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl Add an ioctl FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA which will allow reading verity metadata from a file that has fs-verity enabled, including: - The Merkle tree - The fsverity_descriptor (not including the signature if present) - The built-in signature, if present This ioctl has similar semantics to pread(). It is passed the type of metadata to read (one of the above three), and a buffer, offset, and size. It returns the number of bytes read or an error. Separate patches will add support for each of the above metadata types. This patch just adds the ioctl itself. This ioctl doesn't make any assumption about where the metadata is stored on-disk. It does assume the metadata is in a stable format, but that's basically already the case: - The Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor are defined by how fs-verity file digests are computed; see the "File digest computation" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. Technically, the way in which the levels of the tree are ordered relative to each other wasn't previously specified, but it's logical to put the root level first. - The built-in signature is the value passed to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. This ioctl is useful because it allows writing a server program that takes a verity file and serves it to a client program, such that the client can do its own fs-verity compatible verification of the file. This only makes sense if the client doesn't trust the server and if the server needs to provide the storage for the client. More concretely, there is interest in using this ability in Android to export APK files (which are protected by fs-verity) to "protected VMs". This would use Protected KVM (https://lwn.net/Articles/836693), which provides an isolated execution environment without having to trust the traditional "host". A "guest" VM can boot from a signed image and perform specific tasks in a minimum trusted environment using files that have fs-verity enabled on the host, without trusting the host or requiring that the guest has its own trusted storage. Technically, it would be possible to duplicate the metadata and store it in separate files for serving. However, that would be less efficient and would require extra care in userspace to maintain file consistency. In addition to the above, the ability to read the built-in signatures is useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature verification to migrate to userspace signature verification. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210115181819.34732-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Victor Hsieh <victorhsieh@google.com> Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 5 年前 | |
code_sign 适配6.6内核 Signed-off-by: cbl <caobaolong5@huawei.com> | 1 年前 | |
code_sign 适配6.6内核 Signed-off-by: cbl <caobaolong5@huawei.com> | 1 年前 | |
code_sign 适配6.6内核 Signed-off-by: cbl <caobaolong5@huawei.com> | 1 年前 | |
fsverity: use register_sysctl_init() to avoid kmemleak warning stable inclusion from stable-6.6.34 commit d171c85d74c6fdc84b8082cb034c230b353b8f6a category: bugfix issue: #IB7W7N CVE: NA Signed-off-by: zhangshuqi <zhangshuqi3@huawei.com> --------------------------------------- commit ee5814dddefbaa181cb247a75676dd5103775db1 upstream. Since the fsverity sysctl registration runs as a builtin initcall, there is no corresponding sysctl deregistration and the resulting struct ctl_table_header is not used. This can cause a kmemleak warning just after the system boots up. (A pointer to the ctl_table_header is stored in the fsverity_sysctl_header static variable, which kmemleak should detect; however, the compiler can optimize out that variable.) Avoid the kmemleak warning by using register_sysctl_init() which is intended for use by builtin initcalls and uses kmemleak_not_leak(). Reported-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHj4cs8DTSvR698UE040rs_pX1k-WVe7aR6N2OoXXuhXJPDC-w@mail.gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501025331.594183-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: zhangshuqi <zhangshuqi3@huawei.com> | 1 年前 | |
fsverity: rework fsverity_get_digest() again Address several issues with the calling convention and documentation of fsverity_get_digest(): - Make it provide the hash algorithm as either a FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_* value or HASH_ALGO_* value, at the caller's choice, rather than only a HASH_ALGO_* value as it did before. This allows callers to work with the fsverity native algorithm numbers if they want to. HASH_ALGO_* is what IMA uses, but other users (e.g. overlayfs) should use FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_* to match fsverity-utils and the fsverity UAPI. - Make it return the digest size so that it doesn't need to be looked up separately. Use the return value for this, since 0 works nicely for the "file doesn't have fsverity enabled" case. This also makes it clear that no other errors are possible. - Rename the 'digest' parameter to 'raw_digest' and clearly document that it is only useful in combination with the algorithm ID. This hopefully clears up a point of confusion. - Export it to modules, since overlayfs will need it for checking the fsverity digests of lowerdata files (https://lore.kernel.org/r/dd294a44e8f401e6b5140029d8355f88748cd8fd.1686565330.git.alexl@redhat.com). Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> # for the IMA piece Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230612190047.59755-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 3 年前 | |
code_sign 适配6.6内核 Signed-off-by: cbl <caobaolong5@huawei.com> | 1 年前 | |
fsverity: improve documentation for builtin signature support fsverity builtin signatures (CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) aren't the only way to do signatures with fsverity, and they have some major limitations. Yet, more users have tried to use them, e.g. recently by https://github.com/ostreedev/ostree/pull/2640. In most cases this seems to be because users aren't sufficiently familiar with the limitations of this feature and what the alternatives are. Therefore, make some updates to the documentation to try to clarify the properties of this feature and nudge users in the right direction. Note that the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM, which is not yet upstream, is planned to use the builtin signatures. (This differs from IMA, which uses its own signature mechanism.) For that reason, my earlier patch "fsverity: mark builtin signatures as deprecated" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221208033548.122704-1-ebiggers@kernel.org), which marked builtin signatures as "deprecated", was controversial. This patch therefore stops short of marking the feature as deprecated. I've also revised the language to focus on better explaining the feature and what its alternatives are. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230620041937.5809-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> Reviewed-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 3 年前 | |
code sign 编译依赖问题修改 Signed-off-by: 团辉 <shituanhui@huawei.com> | 1 年前 | |
code_sign 适配6.6内核 Signed-off-by: cbl <caobaolong5@huawei.com> | 1 年前 |
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