issue处理注意事项:
1. 提交正常修复分支的修复PR时,必须关联当前issue,否则无法关闭当前issue;
2. 模板内容需要填写完整, 无论是受影响或者不受影响都需要填写完整内容;
3. 以下为模板中需要填写完整的内容, 请复制到评论区回复;
注: 内容的关键词(影响性分析说明, openEuler评分, 受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响), 修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否), 原因说明)不能省略,省略后cve-manager将无法正常解析填写内容.
影响性分析说明:
openEuler评分: (评分和向量)
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master(6.12.33):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master(6.12.33):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):
原因说明：
1.master(6.12.33):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):
原因说明填写请参考下方表格(注意：版本是否受影响和版本的原因说明必须对应，例如master版本分支受影响，那原因说明只能是受影响对应的原因之一!)：
分支状态 |
原因说明 | 使用场景 |
|---|---|---|
| 受影响 | 正常修复 | 受影响且需要修复（包含升级版本修复）的漏洞； 受影响且已经修复的漏洞（历史修复PR也需要关联issue）； 若因特殊原因无法修复，应修改原因说明为【不修复-特殊原因】，并在安委会备案相关情况。 |
| 受影响 | 暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中 | 已关注到相关漏洞，正在处理，未明确漏洞影响和修复方案。 |
| 受影响 | 暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁 | 当前没有可用的修复或补救措施。【影响性分析】中应包含有关为什么没有修复或补救措施的详细说明、上游相关PR等。 |
| 受影响 | 不修复-超出修复范围 | 没有漏洞的修复计划。当版本停维、软件包宣布生命周期终止或弃用使用。 |
| 受影响 | 不修复-特殊原因导致不再修复 | 如存在其他特殊情况不修复相关漏洞，或评估后无法升级修复，应在openEuler社区安全委员会例会进行说明备案。 【影响性分析】中应包含不发布修复的详细说明、特殊情况还应有安委会会议纪要。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-组件不存在 | 软件不受影响，因为易受攻击的组件不在产品中。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-已有内置的内联控制或缓解措施 | 内置的内联控制或缓解措施可防止攻击者利用漏洞 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发 | 易受攻击的组件存在，并且该组件包含易受攻击的代码。但是，易受攻击的代码的使用方式使得攻击者无法进行任何预期的攻击。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-漏洞代码不在执行路径 | 易受影响的代码在执行过程中不可访问，包括产品的非预期状态。产品不使用也不执行的组件。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-漏洞代码不存在 | 产品不受影响，因为漏洞背后的代码在产品中不存在。与component_not_present不同的是，有问题的组件存在，但由于某种原因（例如安全的编译器选项）使漏洞的特定代码不存在于组件中。 |
issue处理具体操作请参考:
https://atomgit.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md
pr关联issue具体操作请参考:
https://docs.atomgit.com/docs/help/home/org_project/pullrequests/pr-related-issue
检测到新建 CVE Issue，CVE-ID: CVE-2026-31415。
你可以通过以下两种方式使用 CVE 修复服务：
-
分支影响分析
- 在本 Issue 下评论：
/analysis_branches - 系统将自动分析各个分支是否受影响，并在本 Issue 下给出表格形式的分析结果；
- 在本 Issue 下评论：
-
在指定分支上创建 PR（修复提交）
- 在本 Issue 下按如下格式评论（字段均为必填，每个字段单独一行）：
/create_pr
branch: OLK-6.6 OLK-5.10
name: dev
email: dev@devstation.com
- 说明：
branch: 需要创建 PR 的目标分支列表，例如OLK-6.6 OLK-5.10；name: PR 签名人姓名（如责任人或安全负责人）；email: PR 签名人邮箱；
系统会根据上述信息自动在指定分支上创建 PR，并在本 Issue 下反馈结果。
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@wkfxxx 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()Yiming Qian reported :<quote> I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via skb_under_panic() (local DoS). The core issue is a mismatch between: - a 16-bit length accumulator (struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen, type __u16) and - a pointer to the last provided destination-options header (opt->dst1opt) when multiple IPV6_DSTOPTS control messages (cmsgs) are provided. - include/net/ipv6.h: - struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen is __u16 (wrap possible). (lines 291-307, especially 298) - net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl(): - Accepts repeated IPV6_DSTOPTS and accumulates into opt_flen without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933) - net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data(): - Uses opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen to compute header sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465) - net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb(): - Calls ipv6_push_frag_opts() if opt->opt_flen is non-zero. (lines 1930-1934) - net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts() / ipv6_push_exthdr(): - Push size comes from ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt) (based on the pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211) 1. opt_flen is a 16-bit accumulator: - include/net/ipv6.h:298 defines __u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */. 2. ip6_datagram_send_ctl() accepts repeated IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsgs and increments opt_flen each time: - In net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933, for IPV6_DSTOPTS: - It computes len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3); - It checks CAP_NET_RAW using ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW). (line 922) - Then it does: - opt->opt_flen += len; (line 927) - opt->dst1opt = hdr; (line 928) There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy IPV6_2292DSTOPTS path which rejects duplicates at net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904). If enough large IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsgs are provided, opt_flen wraps while dst1opt still points to a large (2048-byte) destination-options header. In the attached PoC (poc.c): - 32 cmsgs with hdrlen=255 => len = (255+1)*8 = 2048 - 1 cmsg with hdrlen=0 => len = 8 - Total increment: 32*2048 + 8 = 65544, so (__u16)opt_flen == 8 - The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so dst1opt points to a 2048-byte header. 3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped opt_flen:- In net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465: - headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...; With wrapped opt_flen, headersize/headroom decisions underestimate what will be pushed later. 4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from dst1opt and is not limited by wrapped opt_flen: - In net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934: - if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto); - In net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211, ipv6_push_frag_opts() pushes dst1opt via ipv6_push_exthdr(). - In net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184, ipv6_push_exthdr() does: - skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt)); - memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt)); With insufficient headroom, skb_push() underflows and triggers skb_under_panic() -> BUG(): - net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675 (skb_push() calls skb_under_panic()) - net/core/skbuff.c:207-214 (skb_panic() ends in BUG()) - The IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsg path requires CAP_NET_RAW in the target netns user namespace (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)). - Root (or any task with CAP_NET_RAW) can trigger this without user namespaces. - An unprivileged uid=1000 user can trigger this if unprivileged user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain namespaced CAP_NET_RAW (the attached PoC does this). - Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash). - Reproducible with a small userspace PoC.</quote>This patch does not reject duplicated options, as this might breaksome user applications.Instead, it makes sure to adjust opt_flen and opt_nflen to correctlyreflect the size of the current option headers, preventing the overflowsand the potential for panics.This applies to IPV6_DSTOPTS, IPV6_HOPOPTS, and IPV6_RTHDR.Specifically:When a new IPV6_DSTOPTS is processed, the length of the old opt->dst1optis subtracted from opt->opt_flen before adding the new length.When a new IPV6_HOPOPTS is processed, the length of the old opt->dst0optis subtracted from opt->opt_nflen.When a new Routing Header (IPV6_RTHDR or IPV6_2292RTHDR) is processed,the length of the old opt->srcrt is subtracted from opt->opt_nflen.In the special case within IPV6_2292RTHDR handling where dst1opt is movedto dst0opt, the length of the old opt->dst0opt is subtracted fromopt->opt_nflen before the new one is added.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-31415 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 5.5 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
一、漏洞信息
漏洞编号：CVE-2026-31415
漏洞归属组件：kernel
漏洞归属的版本：4.19.140,4.19.194,4.19.90,5.10.0,6.1.19,6.12.33,6.18.18,6.4.0,6.6.0
CVSS评分：
BaseScore：5.5 Medium
Vector：CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
漏洞简述：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()Yiming Qian reported :
更多参考(点击展开)
漏洞分析指导链接：
https://atomgit.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md
漏洞数据来源:
七彩瞬析开源风险感知平台
漏洞补丁信息：
详情(点击展开)
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()Yiming Qian reported :<quote> I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via
skb_under_panic()(local DoS). The core issue is a mismatch between: - a 16-bit length accumulator (struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen, type__u16) and - a pointer to the last provided destination-options header (opt->dst1opt) when multipleIPV6_DSTOPTScontrol messages (cmsgs) are provided. -include/net/ipv6.h: -struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flenis__u16(wrap possible). (lines 291-307, especially 298) -net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl(): - Accepts repeatedIPV6_DSTOPTSand accumulates intoopt_flenwithout rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933) -net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data(): - Usesopt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflento compute header sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465) -net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb(): - Callsipv6_push_frag_opts()ifopt->opt_flenis non-zero. (lines 1930-1934) -net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()/ipv6_push_exthdr(): - Push size comes fromipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt)(based on the pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211) 1.opt_flenis a 16-bit accumulator: -include/net/ipv6.h:298defines__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */. 2.ip6_datagram_send_ctl()accepts repeatedIPV6_DSTOPTScmsgs and incrementsopt_fleneach time: - Innet/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933, forIPV6_DSTOPTS: - It computeslen = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);- It checksCAP_NET_RAWusingns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW). (line 922) - Then it does: -opt->opt_flen += len;(line 927) -opt->dst1opt = hdr;(line 928) There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacyIPV6_2292DSTOPTSpath which rejects duplicates atnet/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904). If enough largeIPV6_DSTOPTScmsgs are provided,opt_flenwraps whiledst1optstill points to a large (2048-byte) destination-options header. In the attached PoC (poc.c): - 32 cmsgs withhdrlen=255=>len = (255+1)*8 = 2048- 1 cmsg withhdrlen=0=>len = 8- Total increment:32*2048 + 8 = 65544, so(__u16)opt_flen == 8- The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, sodst1optpoints to a 2048-byte header. 3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrappedopt_flen:- Innet/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465: -headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;With wrappedopt_flen,headersize/headroom decisions underestimate what will be pushed later. 4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes fromdst1optand is not limited by wrappedopt_flen: - Innet/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934: -if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);- Innet/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211,ipv6_push_frag_opts()pushesdst1optviaipv6_push_exthdr(). - Innet/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184,ipv6_push_exthdr()does: -skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));-memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));With insufficient headroom,skb_push()underflows and triggersskb_under_panic()->BUG(): -net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675(skb_push()callsskb_under_panic()) -net/core/skbuff.c:207-214(skb_panic()ends inBUG()) - TheIPV6_DSTOPTScmsg path requiresCAP_NET_RAWin the target netns user namespace (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)). - Root (or any task withCAP_NET_RAW) can trigger this without user namespaces. - An unprivilegeduid=1000user can trigger this if unprivileged user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain namespacedCAP_NET_RAW(the attached PoC does this). - Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash). - Reproducible with a small userspace PoC.</quote>This patch does not reject duplicated options, as this might breaksome user applications.Instead, it makes sure to adjust opt_flen and opt_nflen to correctlyreflect the size of the current option headers, preventing the overflowsand the potential for panics.This applies to IPV6_DSTOPTS, IPV6_HOPOPTS, and IPV6_RTHDR.Specifically:When a new IPV6_DSTOPTS is processed, the length of the old opt->dst1optis subtracted from opt->opt_flen before adding the new length.When a new IPV6_HOPOPTS is processed, the length of the old opt->dst0optis subtracted from opt->opt_nflen.When a new Routing Header (IPV6_RTHDR or IPV6_2292RTHDR) is processed,the length of the old opt->srcrt is subtracted from opt->opt_nflen.In the special case within IPV6_2292RTHDR handling where dst1opt is movedto dst0opt, the length of the old opt->dst0opt is subtracted fromopt->opt_nflen before the new one is added.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-31415 to this issue.openEuler评分：
5.5
Vector：CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响)：
1.master(6.18.18):不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):受影响
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):不受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):受影响
9.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):不受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master(6.18.18):否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):否
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):否
9.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):否
原因说明：
1.master(6.18.18):不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):不修复-超出修复范围
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):正常修复
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):正常修复
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):不修复-超出修复范围
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):正常修复
9.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):不修复-超出修复范围
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发