检测到新建 CVE Issue，CVE-ID: CVE-2026-63886。
你可以通过以下两种方式使用 CVE 修复服务：
-
分支影响分析
- 在本 Issue 下评论：
/analysis_branches - 系统将自动分析各个分支是否受影响，并在本 Issue 下给出表格形式的分析结果；
- 在本 Issue 下评论：
-
在指定分支上创建 PR（修复提交）
- 在本 Issue 下按如下格式评论（字段均为必填，每个字段单独一行）：
/create_pr
branch: OLK-6.6 OLK-5.10
name: dev
email: dev@devstation.com
- 说明：
branch: 需要创建 PR 的目标分支列表，例如OLK-6.6 OLK-5.10；name: PR 签名人姓名（如责任人或安全负责人）；email: PR 签名人邮箱；
系统会根据上述信息自动在指定分支上创建 PR，并在本 Issue 下反馈结果。
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and any of the maintainers: @hanjunguo, @oekernel, @sanglipeng, @wkfxxx, @zeng_zhaorong ,
and any of the committers: @CTC-XiboWang, @Frank_Sae, @GoGo_phytium, @GongLei-, @LiuYongQiang0816, @SuperSix173, @Tankll2021, @TrueAI, @allen-shi, @baratta, @bibo_mao, @caixu-blue, @chen-jun-hw, @chenjiesong, @chenjunxin1992, @chenke2026, @chiqijun, @chriszjh, @duanqiangwen, @eingesch, @fangfeng123, @fanghaiqinghw, @gaojuxin09, @gouhao2022, @guohaocs2c, @guzitao, @hanjunguo, @hanliyang, @hellotcc, @henryze, @hewanhan, @hjx_gitff, @hongbo-lee, @hongwu-wang, @htforge, @hu-chunzhi, @hunan4222, @jackknight, @jerry_lilijun, @jiayi0118, @junlong-zheng, @juntianlinux, @kailiu42, @kaitiandu, @kazero00, @kevinzhu1, @kile2009, @koishimind, @kongzizaixian, @kylin-mayukun, @leoliu-oc, @li-huisong, @linan888, @linyunsheng, @liulongfang, @liyihang0226, @lostway1, @lujialin2, @mao-hongbo, @markyuan4ta21, @mawupeng, @mingqian218472, @mingrui-liu, @mufengyan, @pigalsofine, @robinorg, @rock_hw, @sanglipeng, @shu-shengming, @shuaijiakun, @sming56_admin, @stavewu, @stkid, @sun_nanyong, @wangboe2022, @wanghang73, @wenzhiwei11, @whoisxxx, @wkfxxx, @woqidaideshi, @wsoydl, @xingmz1, @xukuohai, @yeweihua999, @ygn-ndwd-official, @yonghu_4dc5, @young-sun, @yubo-liu1, @yuehaibing_planb, @yuzenghui1, @zhang-changzhong, @zhangyi089, @zhujianwei001, @zichengqu, @zouyipeng, @zqiao216 .
issue处理注意事项:
1. 提交正常修复分支的修复PR时,必须关联当前issue,否则无法关闭当前issue;
2. 模板内容需要填写完整, 无论是受影响或者不受影响都需要填写完整内容;
3. 以下为模板中需要填写完整的内容, 请复制到评论区回复;
注: 内容的关键词(影响性分析说明, openEuler评分, 受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响), 修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否), 原因说明)不能省略,省略后cve-manager将无法正常解析填写内容.
影响性分析说明:
openEuler评分: (评分和向量)
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master(6.18.18):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master(6.18.18):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):
原因说明：
1.master(6.18.18):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):
原因说明填写请参考下方表格(注意：版本是否受影响和版本的原因说明必须对应，例如master版本分支受影响，那原因说明只能是受影响对应的原因之一!)：
分支状态 |
原因说明 | 使用场景 |
|---|---|---|
| 受影响 | 正常修复 | 受影响且需要修复（包含升级版本修复）的漏洞； 受影响且已经修复的漏洞（历史修复PR也需要关联issue）； 若因特殊原因无法修复，应修改原因说明为【不修复-特殊原因】，并在安委会备案相关情况。 |
| 受影响 | 漏洞仍在分析中 | 已关注到相关漏洞，正在处理，未明确漏洞影响和修复方案。 |
| 受影响 | 暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁 | 当前没有可用的修复或补救措施。【影响性分析】中应包含有关为什么没有修复或补救措施的详细说明、上游相关PR等。 |
| 受影响 | 不修复-超出修复范围 | 没有漏洞的修复计划。当版本停维、软件包宣布生命周期终止或弃用使用。 |
| 受影响 | 不修复-特殊原因导致不再修复 | 如存在其他特殊情况不修复相关漏洞，或评估后无法升级修复，应在openEuler社区安全委员会例会进行说明备案。 【影响性分析】中应包含不发布修复的详细说明、特殊情况还应有安委会会议纪要。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-组件不存在 | 软件不受影响，因为易受攻击的组件不在产品中。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-已有内置的内联控制或缓解措施 | 内置的内联控制或缓解措施可防止攻击者利用漏洞 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发 | 易受攻击的组件存在，并且该组件包含易受攻击的代码。但是，易受攻击的代码的使用方式使得攻击者无法进行任何预期的攻击。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-漏洞代码不在执行路径 | 易受影响的代码在执行过程中不可访问，包括产品的非预期状态。产品不使用也不执行的组件。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-漏洞代码不存在 | 产品不受影响，因为漏洞背后的代码在产品中不存在。与component_not_present不同的是，有问题的组件存在，但由于某种原因（例如安全的编译器选项）使漏洞的特定代码不存在于组件中。 |
issue处理具体操作请参考:
https://atomgit.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md
pr关联issue具体操作请参考:
https://docs.atomgit.com/docs/help/home/org_project/pullrequests/pr-related-issue
说明：补丁链接仅供初步排查参考，实际可用性请人工再次确认，补丁下载验证可使用CVE补丁工具。
若补丁不准确，烦请在此issue下评论 '/report-patch 参考网址 补丁链接1,补丁链接2' 反馈正确信息，便于我们不断优化工具，不胜感激。
如 /report-patch https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3997 https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/5b1cf7a9be37e20133c0208005274ce4a5b5c6a1
@Anekoique CVE信息从NVD同步成功, 稍后请重新加载页面.
CVE-2026-63886
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode
chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as
kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,
passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether
the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.
chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long
as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and
the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters
can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256
(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5
(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.
The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.
The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length
up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing
base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length
exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.
Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and
unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',
so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.
The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is
kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1
base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,
DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is
added at the call site to document this.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明：
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
@yuehaibing_planb 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 9.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
CVE-2026-63886
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode
chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as
kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,
passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether
the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.
chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long
as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and
the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters
can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256
(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5
(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.
The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.
The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length
up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing
base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length
exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.
Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and
unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',
so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.
The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is
kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1
base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,
DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is
added at the call site to document this.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明：
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
@yuehaibing_planb 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 9.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
CVE-2026-63886
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode
chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as
kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,
passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether
the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.
chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long
as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and
the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters
can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256
(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5
(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.
The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.
The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length
up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing
base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length
exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.
Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and
unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',
so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.
The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is
kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1
base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,
DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is
added at the call site to document this.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明：
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
@yuehaibing_planb 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 9.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
CVE-2026-63886
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode
chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as
kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,
passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether
the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.
chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long
as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and
the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters
can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256
(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5
(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.
The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.
The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length
up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing
base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length
exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.
Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and
unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',
so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.
The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is
kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1
base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,
DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is
added at the call site to document this.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明：
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
@yuehaibing_planb 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 9.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
CVE-2026-63886
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode
chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as
kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,
passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether
the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.
chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long
as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and
the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters
can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256
(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5
(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.
The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.
The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length
up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing
base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length
exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.
Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and
unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',
so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.
The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is
kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1
base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,
DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is
added at the call site to document this.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明：
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
@yuehaibing_planb 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 9.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
CVE-2026-63886
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode
chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as
kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,
passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether
the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.
chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long
as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and
the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters
can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256
(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5
(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.
The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.
The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length
up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing
base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length
exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.
Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and
unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',
so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.
The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is
kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1
base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,
DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is
added at the call site to document this.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明：
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复
@yuehaibing_planb 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 9.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
经过cve-manager解析，部分分支PR未合入，如红色字体所示：
原因说明：
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复(PR未合入)
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复(PR未合入)
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复(PR未合入)
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
/check-issue
@yuehaibing_planb 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 9.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
经过cve-manager解析，部分分支PR未合入，如红色字体所示：
原因说明：
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复(PR未合入)
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复(PR未合入)
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复(PR未合入)
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
/check-issue
@yuehaibing_planb 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 9.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
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经过cve-manager解析，部分分支PR未合入，如红色字体所示：
原因说明：
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复(PR未合入)
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复(PR未合入)
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
一、漏洞信息
漏洞编号：CVE-2026-63886
漏洞归属组件：kernel
漏洞归属的版本：5.10.0
CVSS评分：
BaseScore：N/A None
Vector：
漏洞简述：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe 0b prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing = before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on = ,so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.
漏洞公开时间：2026-07-20 00:17
漏洞创建时间：2026-07-22 11:11:29
漏洞详情参考链接：
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63886
更多参考(点击展开)
无
漏洞分析指导链接：
https://atomgit.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md
漏洞数据来源:
其他
漏洞补丁信息：
详情(点击展开)
无
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decodechap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest askzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whetherthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as longas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 andthe "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characterscan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the lengthup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailingbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data lengthexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded andunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which iskzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg atCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less thanCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment isadded at the call site to document this.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-63886 to this issue.
openEuler评分：
9.8
Vector：CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响)：
1.master(6.18.40):不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):不受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):不受影响
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):不受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):受影响
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否)：
1.master(6.18.40):否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):否
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):否
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):否
原因说明：
1.master(6.18.40):不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):不受影响-漏洞代码不存在
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):正常修复
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):正常修复
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):正常修复
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):不修复-超出修复范围
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):不修复-超出修复范围