检测到新建 CVE Issue,CVE-ID: CVE-2026-89762。
你可以通过以下两种方式使用 CVE 修复服务:
-
分支影响分析
- 在本 Issue 下评论:
/analysis_branches - 系统将自动分析各个分支是否受影响,并在本 Issue 下给出表格形式的分析结果;
- 在本 Issue 下评论:
-
在指定分支上创建 PR(修复提交)
- 在本 Issue 下按如下格式评论(
branch、name、email为必填字段,每个字段单独一行):
- 在本 Issue 下按如下格式评论(
/create_pr
branch: OLK-6.6 OLK-5.10
name: dev
email: dev@devstation.com
backport-engine: opencode
- 说明:
branch: 需要创建 PR 的目标分支列表,例如OLK-6.6 OLK-5.10;name: PR 签名人姓名(如责任人或安全负责人);email: PR 签名人邮箱;backport-engine(可选):可选portgpt、mystique或opencode;不填时默认使用portgpt,建议使用opencode;
系统会根据上述信息自动在指定分支上创建 PR,并在本 Issue 下反馈结果。
provided by DevStation.


issue处理注意事项:
1. 提交正常修复分支的修复PR时,必须关联当前issue,否则无法关闭当前issue;
2. 模板内容需要填写完整, 无论是受影响或者不受影响都需要填写完整内容;
3. 以下为模板中需要填写完整的内容, 请复制到评论区回复;
注: 内容的关键词(影响性分析说明, openEuler评分, 受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响), 修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否), 原因说明)不能省略,省略后cve-manager将无法正常解析填写内容.
影响性分析说明:
openEuler评分: (评分和向量)
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master(6.18.40):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.master(6.18.40):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):
原因说明:
1.master(6.18.40):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):
原因说明填写请参考下方表格(注意:版本是否受影响和版本的原因说明必须对应,例如master版本分支受影响,那原因说明只能是受影响对应的原因之一!):
分支状态 |
原因说明 | 使用场景 |
|---|---|---|
| 受影响 | 正常修复 | 受影响且需要修复(包含升级版本修复)的漏洞; 受影响且已经修复的漏洞(历史修复PR也需要关联issue); 若因特殊原因无法修复,应修改原因说明为【不修复-特殊原因】,并在安委会备案相关情况。 |
| 受影响 | 暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中 | 已关注到相关漏洞,正在处理,未明确漏洞影响和修复方案。 |
| 受影响 | 暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁 | 当前没有可用的修复或补救措施。【影响性分析】中应包含有关为什么没有修复或补救措施的详细说明、上游相关PR等。 |
| 受影响 | 不修复-超出修复范围 | 没有漏洞的修复计划。当版本停维、软件包宣布生命周期终止或弃用使用。 |
| 受影响 | 不修复-特殊原因导致不再修复 | 如存在其他特殊情况不修复相关漏洞,或评估后无法升级修复,应在openEuler社区安全委员会例会进行说明备案。 【影响性分析】中应包含不发布修复的详细说明、特殊情况还应有安委会会议纪要。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-组件不存在 | 软件不受影响,因为易受攻击的组件不在产品中。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-已有内置的内联控制或缓解措施 | 内置的内联控制或缓解措施可防止攻击者利用漏洞 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发 | 易受攻击的组件存在,并且该组件包含易受攻击的代码。但是,易受攻击的代码的使用方式使得攻击者无法进行任何预期的攻击。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-漏洞代码不在执行路径 | 易受影响的代码在执行过程中不可访问,包括产品的非预期状态。产品不使用也不执行的组件。 |
| 不受影响 | 不受影响-漏洞代码不存在 | 产品不受影响,因为漏洞背后的代码在产品中不存在。与component_not_present不同的是,有问题的组件存在,但由于某种原因(例如安全的编译器选项)使漏洞的特定代码不存在于组件中。 |
issue处理具体操作请参考:
https://atomgit.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md
pr关联issue具体操作请参考:
https://docs.atomgit.com/docs/help/home/org_project/pullrequests/pr-related-issue


说明:补丁链接仅供初步排查参考,实际可用性请人工再次确认,补丁下载验证可使用CVE补丁工具。
若补丁不准确,烦请在此issue下评论 '/report-patch 参考网址 补丁链接1,补丁链接2' 反馈正确信息,便于我们不断优化工具,不胜感激。
如 /report-patch https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3997 https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/5b1cf7a9be37e20133c0208005274ce4a5b5c6a1


@zhangxiaoxv CVE信息从NVD同步失败, 请稍后重试, 或者数据源不存在.


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CVE-2026-89762
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()
AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function called
from lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checks
if the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and if
so, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with an
updated version that uses a new label.
The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of
struct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the current
creds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replaces
creds, like so:
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
alloc_file_pseudo(...);
uid_t uid = cred->euid;
I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think it
is very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.
The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()
runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out if
current_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check in
proc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detect
overridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as the
objective creds.
So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:
- task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds),
with refcount=2 - task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding
- task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old
subjective creds (<creds A>) - task enters AppArmor LSM hook
- AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal
- AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on
<creds A> - task leaves AppArmor LSM hook
- task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)
- now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the
task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B> - another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for
overriding, refcount drops to 0 - now task->real_cred points to freed creds
At this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.
I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a process
using that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file into
a full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()
resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscall
results in a KASAN UAF splat.
To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work that
will run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which the
cred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just a
performance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount of
the new label.)
Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in the
sb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacements
can still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().
There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Either
explicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entire
aa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.
I am switching to manually copying members over because that should make
bugs more obvious.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
7.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明:
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中


@wkfxxx 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function calledfrom lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checksif the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and ifso, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with anupdated version that uses a new label.The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF ofstruct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the currentcreds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replacescreds, like so:const struct cred *cred = current_cred();alloc_file_pseudo(...);uid_t uid = cred->euid;I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think itis very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out ifcurrent_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check inproc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detectoverridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as theobjective creds.So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:1. task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds), with refcount=22. task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding3. task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old subjective creds (<creds A>)4. task enters AppArmor LSM hook5. AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal6. AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on <creds A>7. task leaves AppArmor LSM hook8. task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)9. now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B>10. another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for overriding, refcount drops to 011. now task->real_cred points to freed credsAt this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a processusing that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file intoa full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscallresults in a KASAN UAF splat.To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work thatwill run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which thecred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just aperformance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount ofthe new label.)Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in thesb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacementscan still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Eitherexplicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entireaa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.I am switching to manually copying members over because that should makebugs more obvious.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 7.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.


/create_pr
branch: OLK-6.6 OLK-5.10
name: Yi Yang
email: yiyang13@huawei.com


CVE: CVE-2026-89762 · Workflow: 9f946c817bd948a1817a4f7571454129 · Attempt: 1
状态:已结束
| 分支 | 状态 | PR / 错误 |
|---|---|---|
| OLK-6.6 | succeeded | https://gitcode.com/openeuler/kernel/merge_requests/28427 [source: cve_manager: selected] |
| OLK-5.10 | succeeded | https://gitcode.com/openeuler/kernel/merge_requests/28429 [source: cve_manager: selected] |
显式重试:/retry 9f946c817bd948a1817a4f7571454129(将重新验证来源并生成新的 Attempt)。


CVE-2026-89762
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()
AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function called
from lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checks
if the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and if
so, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with an
updated version that uses a new label.
The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of
struct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the current
creds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replaces
creds, like so:
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
alloc_file_pseudo(...);
uid_t uid = cred->euid;
I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think it
is very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.
The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()
runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out if
current_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check in
proc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detect
overridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as the
objective creds.
So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:
- task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds),
with refcount=2 - task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding
- task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old
subjective creds (<creds A>) - task enters AppArmor LSM hook
- AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal
- AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on
<creds A> - task leaves AppArmor LSM hook
- task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)
- now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the
task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B> - another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for
overriding, refcount drops to 0 - now task->real_cred points to freed creds
At this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.
I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a process
using that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file into
a full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()
resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscall
results in a KASAN UAF splat.
To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work that
will run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which the
cred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just a
performance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount of
the new label.)
Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in the
sb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacements
can still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().
There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Either
explicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entire
aa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.
I am switching to manually copying members over because that should make
bugs more obvious.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
7.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明:
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中


@wkfxxx 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function calledfrom lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checksif the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and ifso, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with anupdated version that uses a new label.The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF ofstruct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the currentcreds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replacescreds, like so:const struct cred *cred = current_cred();alloc_file_pseudo(...);uid_t uid = cred->euid;I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think itis very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out ifcurrent_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check inproc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detectoverridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as theobjective creds.So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:1. task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds), with refcount=22. task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding3. task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old subjective creds (<creds A>)4. task enters AppArmor LSM hook5. AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal6. AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on <creds A>7. task leaves AppArmor LSM hook8. task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)9. now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B>10. another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for overriding, refcount drops to 011. now task->real_cred points to freed credsAt this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a processusing that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file intoa full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscallresults in a KASAN UAF splat.To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work thatwill run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which thecred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just aperformance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount ofthe new label.)Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in thesb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacementscan still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Eitherexplicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entireaa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.I am switching to manually copying members over because that should makebugs more obvious.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 7.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.


CVE-2026-89762
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()
AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function called
from lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checks
if the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and if
so, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with an
updated version that uses a new label.
The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of
struct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the current
creds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replaces
creds, like so:
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
alloc_file_pseudo(...);
uid_t uid = cred->euid;
I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think it
is very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.
The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()
runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out if
current_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check in
proc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detect
overridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as the
objective creds.
So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:
- task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds),
with refcount=2 - task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding
- task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old
subjective creds (<creds A>) - task enters AppArmor LSM hook
- AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal
- AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on
<creds A> - task leaves AppArmor LSM hook
- task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)
- now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the
task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B> - another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for
overriding, refcount drops to 0 - now task->real_cred points to freed creds
At this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.
I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a process
using that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file into
a full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()
resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscall
results in a KASAN UAF splat.
To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work that
will run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which the
cred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just a
performance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount of
the new label.)
Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in the
sb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacements
can still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().
There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Either
explicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entire
aa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.
I am switching to manually copying members over because that should make
bugs more obvious.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
7.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明:
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中


@wkfxxx 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function calledfrom lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checksif the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and ifso, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with anupdated version that uses a new label.The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF ofstruct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the currentcreds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replacescreds, like so:const struct cred *cred = current_cred();alloc_file_pseudo(...);uid_t uid = cred->euid;I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think itis very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out ifcurrent_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check inproc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detectoverridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as theobjective creds.So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:1. task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds), with refcount=22. task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding3. task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old subjective creds (<creds A>)4. task enters AppArmor LSM hook5. AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal6. AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on <creds A>7. task leaves AppArmor LSM hook8. task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)9. now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B>10. another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for overriding, refcount drops to 011. now task->real_cred points to freed credsAt this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a processusing that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file intoa full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscallresults in a KASAN UAF splat.To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work thatwill run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which thecred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just aperformance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount ofthe new label.)Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in thesb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacementscan still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Eitherexplicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entireaa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.I am switching to manually copying members over because that should makebugs more obvious.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 7.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.


CVE-2026-89762
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()
AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function called
from lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checks
if the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and if
so, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with an
updated version that uses a new label.
The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of
struct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the current
creds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replaces
creds, like so:
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
alloc_file_pseudo(...);
uid_t uid = cred->euid;
I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think it
is very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.
The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()
runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out if
current_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check in
proc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detect
overridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as the
objective creds.
So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:
- task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds),
with refcount=2 - task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding
- task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old
subjective creds (<creds A>) - task enters AppArmor LSM hook
- AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal
- AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on
<creds A> - task leaves AppArmor LSM hook
- task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)
- now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the
task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B> - another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for
overriding, refcount drops to 0 - now task->real_cred points to freed creds
At this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.
I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a process
using that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file into
a full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()
resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscall
results in a KASAN UAF splat.
To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work that
will run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which the
cred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just a
performance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount of
the new label.)
Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in the
sb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacements
can still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().
There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Either
explicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entire
aa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.
I am switching to manually copying members over because that should make
bugs more obvious.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
7.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明:
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中


@wkfxxx 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function calledfrom lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checksif the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and ifso, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with anupdated version that uses a new label.The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF ofstruct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the currentcreds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replacescreds, like so:const struct cred *cred = current_cred();alloc_file_pseudo(...);uid_t uid = cred->euid;I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think itis very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out ifcurrent_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check inproc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detectoverridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as theobjective creds.So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:1. task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds), with refcount=22. task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding3. task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old subjective creds (<creds A>)4. task enters AppArmor LSM hook5. AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal6. AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on <creds A>7. task leaves AppArmor LSM hook8. task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)9. now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B>10. another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for overriding, refcount drops to 011. now task->real_cred points to freed credsAt this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a processusing that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file intoa full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscallresults in a KASAN UAF splat.To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work thatwill run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which thecred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just aperformance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount ofthe new label.)Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in thesb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacementscan still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Eitherexplicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entireaa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.I am switching to manually copying members over because that should makebugs more obvious.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 7.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.


经过cve-manager解析,部分分支PR未合入,如红色字体所示:
原因说明:
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复(PR未合入)
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-漏洞仍在分析中
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围


CVE-2026-89762
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()
AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function called
from lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checks
if the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and if
so, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with an
updated version that uses a new label.
The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of
struct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the current
creds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replaces
creds, like so:
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
alloc_file_pseudo(...);
uid_t uid = cred->euid;
I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think it
is very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.
The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()
runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out if
current_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check in
proc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detect
overridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as the
objective creds.
So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:
- task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds),
with refcount=2 - task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding
- task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old
subjective creds (<creds A>) - task enters AppArmor LSM hook
- AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal
- AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on
<creds A> - task leaves AppArmor LSM hook
- task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)
- now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the
task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B> - another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for
overriding, refcount drops to 0 - now task->real_cred points to freed creds
At this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.
I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a process
using that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file into
a full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()
resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscall
results in a KASAN UAF splat.
To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work that
will run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which the
cred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just a
performance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount of
the new label.)
Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in the
sb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacements
can still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().
There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Either
explicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entire
aa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.
I am switching to manually copying members over because that should make
bugs more obvious.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
7.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master:不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.master:否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否
原因说明:
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复
8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复


@wkfxxx 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
| 状态 | 分析项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function calledfrom lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checksif the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and ifso, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with anupdated version that uses a new label.The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF ofstruct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the currentcreds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replacescreds, like so:const struct cred *cred = current_cred();alloc_file_pseudo(...);uid_t uid = cred->euid;I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think itis very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out ifcurrent_cred() != current_real_cred() (mirroring the check inproc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detectoverridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as theobjective creds.So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:1. task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds), with refcount=22. task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding3. task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old subjective creds (<creds A>)4. task enters AppArmor LSM hook5. AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal6. AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on <creds A>7. task leaves AppArmor LSM hook8. task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)9. now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B>10. another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for overriding, refcount drops to 011. now task->real_cred points to freed credsAt this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a processusing that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file intoa full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscallresults in a KASAN UAF splat.To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work thatwill run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which thecred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just aperformance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount ofthe new label.)Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in thesb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacementscan still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Eitherexplicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entireaa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.I am switching to manually copying members over because that should makebugs more obvious.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue. |
| 已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 7.8 |
| 已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | master:不受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:受影响 |
| 已分析 | 5.是否涉及abi变化 | master:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:否 |
| 已分析 | 6.原因说明 | master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.


经过cve-manager解析,部分分支PR未合入,如红色字体所示:
原因说明:
1.master:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复(PR未合入)
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1:正常修复(PR未合入)
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3:正常修复(PR未合入)
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4:正常修复(PR未合入)
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不修复-超出修复范围
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2:不修复-超出修复范围


一、漏洞信息 (as both objective and subjective creds), with refcount=22. task grabs an extra reference on for overriding3. task calls override_creds(), which returns a pointer to the old subjective creds ()4. task enters AppArmor LSM hook5. AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal6. AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with and drops 2 refs on 7. task leaves AppArmor LSM hook8. task calls revert_creds()9. now task->cred is while task->real_cred is , but the task_struct logically holds two references to 10. another task drops the extra reference on that was used for overriding, refcount drops to 011. now task->real_cred points to freed credsAt this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a processusing that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file intoa full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscallresults in a KASAN UAF splat.To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work thatwill run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which thecred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just aperformance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount ofthe new label.)Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in thesb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacementscan still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Eitherexplicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entireaa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.I am switching to manually copying members over because that should makebugs more obvious.
漏洞编号:CVE-2026-89762
漏洞归属组件:kernel
漏洞归属的版本:4.19.140,4.19.194,4.19.90,5.10.0,6.1.19,6.12.33,6.18.18,6.18.40,6.4.0,6.6.0
CVSS评分:
BaseScore:7.8 High
Vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
漏洞简述:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()AppArmor s begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function calledfrom lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checksif the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and ifso, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with anupdated version that uses a new label.The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of
struct credif anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the currentcreds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replacescreds, like so:const struct cred *cred = current_cred();alloc_file_pseudo(...);uid_t uid = cred->euid;I don t know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think itis very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out ifcurrent_cred() != current_real_cred()(mirroring the check inproc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can t actually reliably detectoverridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as theobjective creds.So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:1. task begins with漏洞公开时间:2026-09-12 04:20:07
漏洞创建时间:2026-09-15 03:00:13
漏洞详情参考链接:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89762
更多参考(点击展开)
漏洞分析指导链接:
https://atomgit.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md
漏洞数据来源:
七彩瞬析开源风险感知平台
漏洞补丁信息:
详情(点击展开)
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function calledfrom lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checksif the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and ifso, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with anupdated version that uses a new label.The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of
struct credif anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the currentcreds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replacescreds, like so:const struct cred *cred = current_cred();alloc_file_pseudo(...);uid_t uid = cred->euid;I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think itis very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out ifcurrent_cred() != current_real_cred()(mirroring the check inproc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detectoverridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as theobjective creds.So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:1. task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds), with refcount=22. task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding3. task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old subjective creds (<creds A>)4. task enters AppArmor LSM hook5. AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal6. AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on <creds A>7. task leaves AppArmor LSM hook8. task calls revert_creds(<creds A>)9. now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B>10. another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for overriding, refcount drops to 011. now task->real_cred points to freed credsAt this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a processusing that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file intoa full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscallresults in a KASAN UAF splat.To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work thatwill run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which thecred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just aperformance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount ofthe new label.)Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in thesb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacementscan still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Eitherexplicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entireaa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.I am switching to manually copying members over because that should makebugs more obvious.The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89762 to this issue.openEuler评分:
7.8
Vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master(6.18.40):不受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):受影响
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):不受影响
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):受影响
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):受影响
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):受影响
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):受影响
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.master(6.18.40):否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):否
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):否
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):否
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):否
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):否
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):否
原因说明:
1.master(6.18.40):不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):暂不修复-暂无解决方案或补丁
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(5.10.0):正常修复
4.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):不受影响-漏洞代码不能被攻击者触发
5.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(6.6.0):正常修复
6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3(6.6.0):正常修复
7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4(6.6.0):正常修复
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):不修复-超出修复范围
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):不修复-超出修复范围
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(6.6.0):不修复-超出修复范围