WWang Huaishm: Slim down dependencies
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apparmor: fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loop commit 6f060496d03e4dc560a40f73770bd08335cb7a27 upstream. aa_replace_profiles() walks ns->rawdata_list to dedup the incoming policy blob against entries already attached to existing profiles. Per the kernel-doc on struct aa_loaddata, list membership does not hold a reference: profiles hold pcount, and when the last pcount drops, do_ploaddata_rmfs() is queued on a workqueue that takes ns->lock and removes the entry. Between dropping the last pcount and the workqueue running, an entry remains on the list with pcount == 0. aa_get_profile_loaddata() is an unconditional kref_get() on pcount, so when the dedup loop hits such an entry, refcount hardening reports refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. inside aa_replace_profiles(), and the poisoned counter then trips "saturated" and "underflow" warnings on the subsequent uses of the same loaddata. Before commit a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference") the dedup path used a get_unless_zero-style helper on a single counter, so the existing "if (tmp)" guard was meaningful. The split-refcount refactor introduced aa_get_profile_loaddata(), which has plain kref_get() semantics, and the guard quietly became a no-op. Introduce aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(), matching the existing _not0 convention used by aa_get_profile_not0(), and use it for the rawdata_list dedup lookup so dying entries are skipped. Reproduced on x86_64 with v7.1-rc5 in QEMU+KVM running Ubuntu 24.04 + stress-ng 0.17.06: stress-ng --apparmor 1 --klog-check --timeout 60s Without this patch the three refcount_t warnings fire within a few seconds. With it the same 60 s run is clean. Coverage is a smoke-test only; a longer soak with CONFIG_KASAN, CONFIG_KCSAN and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING would be welcome from anyone with the cycles. Fixes: a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference") Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221513 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 15fd83a1e42ede15070968806bb6c8b1a5170688) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 17 天前 | |
bpf: lsm: Set bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_task to 0 commit 300a90b2cb5d442879e6398920c49aebbd5c8e40 upstream. bpf task local storage is now using task_struct->bpf_storage, so bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_task is no longer needed. Remove it to save some memory. Fixes: a10787e6d58c ("bpf: Enable task local storage for tracing programs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Cc: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Acked-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240911055508.9588-1-song@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 1 年前 | |
ima: verify the previous kernel's IMA buffer lies in addressable RAM [ Upstream commit 10d1c75ed4382a8e79874379caa2ead8952734f9 ] Patch series "Address page fault in ima_restore_measurement_list()", v3. When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command line such as "mem=<size>" we observe a pafe fault that happens. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000 RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a #PF: error_code(0x0000) not-present page This happens on x86_64 only, as this is already fixed in aarch64 in commit: cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds") This patch (of 3): When the second-stage kernel is booted with a limiting command line (e.g. "mem=<size>"), the IMA measurement buffer handed over from the previous kernel may fall outside the addressable RAM of the new kernel. Accessing such a buffer can fault during early restore. Introduce a small generic helper, ima_validate_range(), which verifies that a physical [start, end] range for the previous-kernel IMA buffer lies within addressable memory: - On x86, use pfn_range_is_mapped(). - On OF based architectures, use page_is_ram(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251231061609.907170-1-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251231061609.907170-2-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: guoweikang <guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Henry Willard <henry.willard@oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Cc: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Webb <paul.x.webb@oracle.com> Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yifei Liu <yifei.l.liu@oracle.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wenshan Lan <jetlan9@163.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 43308106a1762b72f3b20a44b75b2df5cb25b77b) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 1 个月前 | |
keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths commit fd15b457a86939c38aa12116adabd8ff686c5e51 upstream. A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV ================ ========================= create auth key store rka in auth key wait for helper get auth key load rka from auth key copy user payload sleep on #PF helper completed detach and free rka destroy auth key wake up use rka->target_key **USE-AFTER-FREE** Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key owning reference from revoke and destroy. [jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual concurrency scenario.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys") Reported-by: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260519144403.436694-1-eeesssooo020@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 35ab4db86774d82389e4b9559e26ab7f68d8e395) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 17 天前 | |
landlock: Fix handling of disconnected directories [ Upstream commit 49c9e09d961025b22e61ef9ad56aa1c21b6ce2f1 ] Disconnected files or directories can appear when they are visible and opened from a bind mount, but have been renamed or moved from the source of the bind mount in a way that makes them inaccessible from the mount point (i.e. out of scope). Previously, access rights tied to files or directories opened through a disconnected directory were collected by walking the related hierarchy down to the root of the filesystem, without taking into account the mount point because it couldn't be found. This could lead to inconsistent access results, potential access right widening, and hard-to-debug renames, especially since such paths cannot be printed. For a sandboxed task to create a disconnected directory, it needs to have write access (i.e. FS_MAKE_REG, FS_REMOVE_FILE, and FS_REFER) to the underlying source of the bind mount, and read access to the related mount point. Because a sandboxed task cannot acquire more access rights than those defined by its Landlock domain, this could lead to inconsistent access rights due to missing permissions that should be inherited from the mount point hierarchy, while inheriting permissions from the filesystem hierarchy hidden by this mount point instead. Landlock now handles files and directories opened from disconnected directories by taking into account the filesystem hierarchy when the mount point is not found in the hierarchy walk, and also always taking into account the mount point from which these disconnected directories were opened. This ensures that a rename is not allowed if it would widen access rights [1]. The rationale is that, even if disconnected hierarchies might not be visible or accessible to a sandboxed task, relying on the collected access rights from them improves the guarantee that access rights will not be widened during a rename because of the access right comparison between the source and the destination (see LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER). It may look like this would grant more access on disconnected files and directories, but the security policies are always enforced for all the evaluated hierarchies. This new behavior should be less surprising to users and safer from an access control perspective. Remove a wrong WARN_ON_ONCE() canary in collect_domain_accesses() and fix the related comment. Because opened files have their access rights stored in the related file security properties, there is no impact for disconnected or unlinked files. Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Reported-by: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/027d5190-b37a-40a8-84e9-4ccbc352bcdf@maowtm.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/09b24128f86973a6022e6aa8338945fcfb9a33e4.1749925391.git.m@maowtm.org Fixes: b91c3e4ea756 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER") Fixes: cb2c7d1a1776 ("landlock: Support filesystem access-control") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b0f46246-f2c5-42ca-93ce-0d629702a987@maowtm.org [1] Reviewed-by: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251128172200.760753-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <bin.lan.cn@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit fbf718d5afe21057694a0c0223a18b0c7a5960b6) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 1 个月前 | |
lsm: remove the now superfluous sentinel element from ctl_table array mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 category: performance This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels) which will reduce the overall build time size of the kernel and run time memory bloat by ~64 bytes per sentinel (further information Link : https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZO5Yx5JFogGi%2FcBo@bombadil.infradead.org/) Remove the sentinel from all files under security/ that register a sysctl table. Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> # loadpin & yama Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Conflicts: security/apparmor/lsm.c (cherry picked from commit 74560bb3685b3600da911d92d134899ce9f8bcc1) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 1 个月前 | |
efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode Based on an earlier patch by David Howells, who wrote the following description: > UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will > only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also > require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option > that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed > modules - if the kernel is secure-booted. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> [Salvatore Bonaccorso: After fixing https://bugs.debian.org/956197 the help text for LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT was adjusted to mention that lockdown is triggered in integrity mode (https://bugs.debian.org/1025417)] Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> | 1 年前 | |
safesetid: check size of policy writes [ Upstream commit f09ff307c7299392f1c88f763299e24bc99811c7 ] syzbot attempts to write a buffer with a large size to a sysfs entry with writes handled by handle_policy_update(), triggering a warning in kmalloc. Check the size specified for write buffers before allocating. Reported-by: syzbot+4eb7a741b3216020043a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4eb7a741b3216020043a Signed-off-by: Leo Stone <leocstone@gmail.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> | 1 年前 | |
shm: Slim down dependencies mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 category: performance list_head is in types.h, not list.h., and the uapi header wasn't needed. Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> (cherry picked from commit bc46ef3cea3d6f63952d7e29a324e889c34970a8) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 10 天前 | |
shm: Slim down dependencies mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 category: performance list_head is in types.h, not list.h., and the uapi header wasn't needed. Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> (cherry picked from commit bc46ef3cea3d6f63952d7e29a324e889c34970a8) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 10 天前 | |
lsm: constify 'bprm' parameter in security_bprm_committed_creds() mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.7-rc1 category: performance Three LSMs register the implementations for the 'bprm_committed_creds()' hook: AppArmor, SELinux and tomoyo. Looking at the function implementations we may observe that the 'bprm' parameter is not changing. Mark the 'bprm' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_committed_creds() as 'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> [PM: minor merge fuzzing due to other constification patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (cherry picked from commit a721f7b8c3548e943e514a957f2a37f4763b9888) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 1 个月前 | |
lsm: remove the now superfluous sentinel element from ctl_table array mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 category: performance This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels) which will reduce the overall build time size of the kernel and run time memory bloat by ~64 bytes per sentinel (further information Link : https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZO5Yx5JFogGi%2FcBo@bombadil.infradead.org/) Remove the sentinel from all files under security/ that register a sysctl table. Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> # loadpin & yama Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Conflicts: security/apparmor/lsm.c (cherry picked from commit 74560bb3685b3600da911d92d134899ce9f8bcc1) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 1 个月前 | |
proc: add config & param to block forcing mem writes [ Upstream commit 41e8149c8892ed1962bd15350b3c3e6e90cba7f4 ] This adds a Kconfig option and boot param to allow removing the FOLL_FORCE flag from /proc/pid/mem write calls because it can be abused. The traditional forcing behavior is kept as default because it can break GDB and some other use cases. Previously we tried a more sophisticated approach allowing distributions to fine-tune /proc/pid/mem behavior, however that got NAK-ed by Linus [1], who prefers this simpler approach with semantics also easier to understand for users. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiGWLChxYmUA5HrT5aopZrB7_2VTa0NLZcxORgkUe5tEQ@mail.gmail.com/ [1] Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802080225.89408-1-adrian.ratiu@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> | 1 年前 | |
hardening: Move BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION to hardening options BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION is turning detected corruptions of list data structures from WARNings into BUGs. This can be useful to stop further corruptions or even exploitation attempts. However, the option has less to do with debugging than with hardening. With the introduction of LIST_HARDENED, it makes more sense to move it to the hardening options, where it selects LIST_HARDENED instead. Without this change, combining BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION with LIST_HARDENED alone wouldn't be possible, because DEBUG_LIST would always be selected by BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811151847.1594958-4-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2 年前 | |
security: remove unneeded subdir-$(CONFIG_...) All of these are unneeded. The directories to descend are specified by obj-$(CONFIG_...). Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> | 4 年前 | |
deepin: OWNERS: Update OWNERS Follow changes: *1. Due to job changes and other factors, move matrix-wsk and MingcongBai from approver to emeritus_approver. 2. With sincere gratitude, extend an invitation to Avenger-285714 and Wenlp to join us as reviewers for the alpha and sw64 subsystem. 3. With sincere gratitude, extend an invitation to Avenger-285714 and MingcongBai to join us as reviewers for the loongarch subsystem. 4. With sincere gratitude, extend an invitation to Avenger-285714 to join us as a reviewer for the mips, s390 and security subsystem. 5. With sincere gratitude, extend an invitation to RevySR and YukariChiba to join us as reviewers for the riscv subsystem. 6. With sincere gratitude, extend an invitation to opsiff to join us as a reviewer for the net subsystem. 7. With sincere gratitude, extend an invitation to black-desk and winnscode to join us as reviewers for the fuse subsystem. Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com> | 1 年前 | |
lsm: constify 'file' parameter in security_bprm_creds_from_file() mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.7-rc1 category: performance The 'bprm_creds_from_file' hook has implementation registered in commoncap. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the 'file' parameter is not changing. Mark the 'file' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_creds_from_file() as 'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (cherry picked from commit 4a00c673068e72c12d243f5c31000246d6984e44) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 1 个月前 | |
device_cgroup: Fix kernel-doc warnings in device_cgroup Fix kernel-doc warnings in device_cgroup: security/device_cgroup.c:835: warning: Excess function parameter 'dev_cgroup' description in 'devcgroup_legacy_check_permission'. Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 3 年前 | |
securityfs: don't pin dentries twice, once is enough... [ Upstream commit 27cd1bf1240d482e4f02ca4f9812e748f3106e4f ] incidentally, securityfs_recursive_remove() is broken without that - it leaks dentries, since simple_recursive_removal() does not expect anything of that sort. It could be worked around by dput() in remove_one() callback, but it's easier to just drop that double-get stuff. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit d7e28036b0e938c689d98efa812d4138cda38e07) | 10 个月前 | |
lsm: fix a number of misspellings A random collection of spelling fixes for source files in the LSM layer. Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 3 年前 | |
sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and from userspace in common code. This also means that the strings are always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit safer. As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers a lot of the changes are mechnical. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 6 年前 | |
lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks [ Upstream commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 ] Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the mmap() and mprotect() operations. In order to resolve this gap, a LSM security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following new LSM hooks are being created: security_backing_file_alloc() security_backing_file_free() security_mmap_backing_file() The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access control point for the underlying backing file. It is also expected that LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook. There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks: * Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the security_backing_file_alloc() hook. * Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c. * Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into the common LSM audit code. Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() and supplying a fixup. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> [1. Mainline uses call_int_hook(FUNC, ...) with the default IRC baked into the macro. Linux 6.6.y uses call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) requiring an explicit default return value. 2. fs/backing-file.c does not exist in LTS Linux 6.6.y places backing_file_open() in fs/open.c and lacks a dedicated fs/backing-file.c. The backing_file_mmap() function and scoped_with_creds() do not exist in 6.6.y. Therefore the LTS patch calls security_mmap_backing_file() directly in ovl_mmap() in fs/overlayfs/file.c rather than modifying backing_file_mmap(). 3. Missing filesystems/modules Linux 6.6.y does not have backing_tmpfile_open(), fs/fuse/passthrough.c, or the erofs ishare mmap path that the mainline patch touches. These hunks are dropped in the 6.6 LTS backport. 4. Use macro backing_file to replace inline function to eliminate the const warning.] Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/internal.h (cherry picked from commit 41c5b269af8b1f0bffcab7766a793f294ae6764e) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> | 17 天前 |