kernel/security/integrity · deepin-community/kernel

Kkoishimindevm: terminate and bound the evm_xattrs read buffer

文件	最后提交记录	最后更新时间
evm	evm: terminate and bound the evm_xattrs read buffer [ Upstream commit 11143a19f5b8dc8f414deab87571134f9f447313 ] evm_read_xattrs() allocates size + 1 bytes, fills them from the list of enabled xattrs, and then passes strlen(temp) to simple_read_from_buffer(). When no configured xattrs are enabled, the fill loop stores nothing and temp[0] remains uninitialized, so strlen() reads beyond initialized memory. Explicitly terminate the buffer after allocation, use snprintf() for each formatted line, and pass the accumulated length, without risk of truncation, to simple_read_from_buffer(). Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit a36cbfb85f26e6c6fb6529b1a364331b94dc88f3) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>	9 天前
ima	ima: verify the previous kernel's IMA buffer lies in addressable RAM [ Upstream commit 10d1c75ed4382a8e79874379caa2ead8952734f9 ] Patch series "Address page fault in ima_restore_measurement_list()", v3. When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command line such as "mem=<size>" we observe a pafe fault that happens. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000 RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a #PF: error_code(0x0000) not-present page This happens on x86_64 only, as this is already fixed in aarch64 in commit: cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds") This patch (of 3): When the second-stage kernel is booted with a limiting command line (e.g. "mem=<size>"), the IMA measurement buffer handed over from the previous kernel may fall outside the addressable RAM of the new kernel. Accessing such a buffer can fault during early restore. Introduce a small generic helper, ima_validate_range(), which verifies that a physical [start, end] range for the previous-kernel IMA buffer lies within addressable memory: - On x86, use pfn_range_is_mapped(). - On OF based architectures, use page_is_ram(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251231061609.907170-1-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251231061609.907170-2-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: guoweikang <guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Henry Willard <henry.willard@oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Cc: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Webb <paul.x.webb@oracle.com> Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yifei Liu <yifei.l.liu@oracle.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wenshan Lan <jetlan9@163.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 43308106a1762b72f3b20a44b75b2df5cb25b77b) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>	1 个月前
platform_certs	Merge tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: - Restrict linking of keys to .ima and .evm keyrings based on digitalSignature attribute in the certificate - PowerVM: load machine owner keys into the .machine [1] keyring - PowerVM: load module signing keys into the secondary trusted keyring (keys blessed by the vendor) - tpm_tis_spi: half-duplex transfer mode - tpm_tis: retry corrupted transfers - Apply revocation list (.mokx) to an all system keyrings (e.g. .machine keyring) Link: https://blogs.oracle.com/linux/post/the-machine-keyring [1] * tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: certs: Reference revocation list for all keyrings tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer: Use module_platform_driver macro to simplify the code tpm: remove redundant variable len tpm_tis: Resend command to recover from data transfer errors tpm_tis: Use responseRetry to recover from data transfer errors tpm_tis: Move CRC check to generic send routine tpm_tis_spi: Add hardware wait polling KEYS: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpy integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring integrity: Enforce digitalSignature usage in the ima and evm keyrings KEYS: DigitalSignature link restriction tpm_tis: Revert "tpm_tis: Disable interrupts on ThinkPad T490s"	2 年前
Kconfig	integrity: powerpc: Do not select CA_MACHINE_KEYRING commit 3edc22655647378dea01900f7b04e017ff96bda9 upstream. No other platform needs CA_MACHINE_KEYRING, either. This is policy that should be decided by the administrator, not Kconfig dependencies. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.6+ Fixes: d7d91c4743c4 ("integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement") Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>	2 年前
Makefile	integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim. The UEFI shim provides what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain. The MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys. These keys can be used to sign an end-users development kernel build. When Linux boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux .platform keyring. Define a new Linux keyring called machine. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new machine keyring will be used in follow on patches. Unlike keys in the platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>	4 年前
digsig.c	integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled trust_moklist() is specific to UEFI enabled systems. Other platforms rely only on the Kconfig. Define a generic wrapper named imputed_trust_enabled(). Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>	2 年前
digsig_asymmetric.c	ima: fix reference leak in asymmetric_verify() Don't leak a reference to the key if its algorithm is unknown. Fixes: 947d70597236 ("ima: Support EC keys for signature verification") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.13+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>	4 年前
iint.c	treewide: mark stuff as __ro_after_init mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.7-rc1 category: security __read_mostly predates __ro_after_init. Many variables which are marked __read_mostly should have been __ro_after_init from day 1. Also, mark some stuff as "const" and "__init" while I'm at it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: revert sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max changes due to arm warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f6bb9c0-abba-4ee4-a7aa-89265e886817@p183 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 68279f9c9f592e75d30a9ba5154a15e0a0b42ae8) Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>	1 年前
integrity.h	ima: limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations [ Upstream commit a414016218ca97140171aa3bb926b02e1f68c2cc ] Each time a file in policy, that is already opened for read, is opened for write, a Time-of-Measure-Time-of-Use (ToMToU) integrity violation audit message is emitted and a violation record is added to the IMA measurement list. This occurs even if a ToMToU violation has already been recorded. Limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations per file open for read. Note: The IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU atomic flag must be set from the reader side based on policy. This may result in a per file open for read ToMToU violation. Since IMA_MUST_MEASURE is only used for violations, rename the atomic IMA_MUST_MEASURE flag to IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # applies cleanly up to linux-6.6 Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Tested-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> [ adapted IMA flag definitions location from ima.h to integrity.h ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 0214b96a6a6303140c78f798a98ce168cc0475ce)	10 个月前
integrity_audit.c	integrity: check the return value of audit_log_start() audit_log_start() returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on error, so it is better to check the return value of it. Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang <xkernel.wang@foxmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>	4 年前